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1 March 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 44 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 1 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter from H.E. Mr. Fares Boueiz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, addressed to you, concerning the ongoing Israeli naval blockade of the southern port cities of Lebanon and the continuous Israeli aggression against Lebanon and its citizens.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be distributed urgently as an official document of the General Assembly under item 44 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/50/50.

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ANNEX

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

I have the honour to inform you that Israel's naval blockade of the city of Tyre has now spread to all port cities of southern Lebanon, affecting Sarafand as well as Sidon and Damour. In addition, Israeli naval patrols are constantly to be found in Lebanese territorial waters, violating Lebanese sovereignty and preventing Lebanese fishermen from engaging in the fishing which is their sole livelihood.

This blockade is being accompanied daily by heavy artillery shelling and murderous air-raids which have resulted in numerous casualties among innocent civilians in southern Lebanon and in the western Bekaa and caused considerable material damage.

These mindless acts of aggression, which lack any justification, are occurring at a time when Israel is seeking to destabilize Lebanon and impede the return to normality and the reconstruction effort. They succeed in diverting attention from the fact that Israel is seeking to thwart the implementation of the Middle East peace process in accordance with the principles endorsed by Lebanon at the Madrid Conference.

We wish to stress that we are fully justified - and this is in the interest of all the parties concerned with peace - in wanting Lebanon to remain stable and to play an effective role in the peace process. Such a role can only be filled, however, if the Security Council implements its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 508 (1982), which call for Israel to withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally from the Lebanese territory it occupies in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa.

Accordingly, while we are expressing our gratitude for your unceasing support for our country's rights, we urge you to intensify the efforts you are making in your personal capacity, and we call upon the United Nations and the Security Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that the aforementioned resolutions are implemented in order that Israel might respect the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon on land and on sea, cease its daily attacks on innocent civilians in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa and lift its naval blockade of Lebanese coastal ports.

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1 March 1995
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 42
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE AND
PROGRESS IN FASHIONING A REGION
OF PEACE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In my letters of 28 December 1994 to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/48/825-S/1994/1453), I informed Member States that on 22 December I had sent letters to the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) requesting them to indicate the steps they would be prepared to take to enable the peace negotiations to regain their momentum and achieve, as the General Assembly requested in its resolution 49/137 of 19 December 1994, agreement on a firm and lasting peace as close as possible to the target date of 31 December 1994 agreed by the parties in the framework agreement of 10 January 1994 (A/49/61-S/1994/53) and the agreement on the timetable of 29 March 1994 (A/48/928-S/1994/448).

2. I received replies from the President of Guatemala and URNG on 3 and 9 January 1995, respectively. In these replies, both parties recognized the need to give new dynamism to the peace process. They also shared the view that steps could be taken to facilitate the early conclusion of negotiations on complex substantive issues that are yet to be considered, namely "economic and social issues and the agrarian situation", "strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society" and "constitutional reforms and electoral regime". However, the steps proposed by the parties to achieve that goal were incompatible.

3. In its letter of 3 January 1995, the Government proposed that the parties should agree to transfer consideration of "economic and social issues and the agrarian situation" and "strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society" to representative bodies of Guatemalan society, which

would be given joint or separate suggestions from the parties. In its letter of 9 January 1995, URNG proposed that the parties should turn into agreements and sign the three consensus documents already prepared for the parties' consideration by the Assembly of Civil Society on the three issues mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

4. To overcome this impasse, and also bearing in mind the need to foster confidence in the peace process and the presence in Guatemala of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (MINUGUA), I instructed the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Goulding, to travel to Guatemala and Mexico City to meet with the Government of Guatemala and the leadership of URNG, respectively, and present to them a set of proposals. These consisted of the early presentation by both parties of their proposals on all pending issues and the preparation by the United Nations Moderator of drafts on those issues; the preparation of a revised timetable aiming at completing the negotiations before the start of the campaign, which is expected to begin in May or June, for presidential elections in November; an informal three-month suspension of offensive military activities; a commitment by all political parties presenting candidates to the presidential elections to accept and implement the results of the negotiation; and measures to intensify implementation of agreements already signed and to inform the Guatemalan people of the current benefits and future gains to be obtained from the peace process.

5. While the Government of Guatemala agreed to the package, URNG expressed serious reservations about several of its elements. Following an assessment of the parties' responses, a revised set of measures was prepared and conveyed to the parties in letters dated 17 February 1995 addressed by Mr. Goulding to the President of Guatemala and the leadership of URNG (see annex I). In these letters, it was stressed that, should the response of the two parties to the revised package be positive, I would indicate to the General Assembly and the Security Council that I would be prepared to continue providing full assistance to the peace process through "moderation" of the negotiations and verification of all agreements reached. Otherwise, I would indicate to the General Assembly and the Security Council that the modalities for the participation of the United Nations in the peace process would have to be reconsidered.

6. On 20 February 1995, the President of Guatemala replied that the Government agreed to the revised set of proposals (see annex II). On 24 February, the leadership of URNG also conveyed its acceptance of the United Nations proposals (see annex III). Taken together, these replies provide an opportunity for the parties to recapture lost momentum and to conclude a package of agreements that would ensure the end of the armed confrontation while at the same time laying the foundations for a lasting peace.

7. On that basis, and even though the timetable envisaged in the Framework Agreement has had to be revised, I consider that minimum conditions exist for the continued involvement of the United Nations in the Guatemala peace process. I have, therefore, instructed the United Nations Moderator to contact the parties to make arrangements for the earliest possible finalization of the agreement on the current item on the negotiating agenda, namely the identity and rights of indigenous people.

8. However, it would be difficult for me to recommend that United Nations support for the peace negotiations be continued in its present form unless I can assume that the parties are sincerely committed to a genuine effort to negotiate in a serious and responsible way. The dates contained in the timetable should be seen as targets. While they should not become a strait-jacket, the parties are asked to show good faith by achieving progress as far as possible in that framework. As I pointed out in my letters to the parties dated 22 December 1994, the United Nations involvement cannot be a substitute for the parties' firm political will to negotiate and implement, seriously and resolutely, a peace settlement. Nor, of course, can it continue indefinitely if that political will is not in evidence on both sides.

9. As indicated in paragraph 2 above, both parties acknowledged, in their replies to my letters of 22 December, the difficulty of reaching agreement on the so-called substantive issues. However, the negotiation of the agreement on resettlement of population groups uprooted by the armed conflict, signed on 17 June 1994, and endorsed as a "national commitment" by the Assembly of Civil Society on 21 December 1994, has already demonstrated that dedication and flexibility can lead quickly to agreements that constitute real advances for Guatemalan society, and can mobilize national and international efforts in favour of their implementation. I hope that the parties will negotiate in the same spirit on outstanding substantive issues, including, in the immediate future, the item entitled "identity and rights of indigenous people". Much effort was devoted to that important question between 20 October and 20 December 1994. In their replies to my letters of 22 December 1994, both parties expressed their willingness to reach agreement promptly on that issue, on the basis of a draft already submitted by the Moderator. I therefore expect both parties to spare no effort to finalize that important agreement at the earliest possible date.

Annex I

Part One

Identical letters dated 17 February 1995 from the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the President of Guatemala and to the members of the Comandancia of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

The Secretary-General has asked me to thank you for your reply to his letter of 22 December 1994. Based on your reply and that of ... [the other party], and taking into account in particular the fact that both parties have renewed in their letters their commitment to a dynamic negotiating process as envisaged in the framework agreement of 10 January 1994 (A/49/61-S/1994/53), the Secretary-General instructed me to present to you and ... [the other party] a package of measures aimed at giving the negotiations new momentum, strengthening the credibility of the peace process and facilitating the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (MINUGUA).

Having analysed the consultations held with the parties since 23 January 1995, I am now in a position to convey to you a revised set of proposals, which are annexed to this letter. These proposals are based on the commitments contained in the framework agreement and the agreement on the timetable of 29 March 1994 (A/48/928-S/1994/448), the presence in Guatemala of MINUGUA and observations made by both parties during the consultations mentioned above, as well as on the proposals of the Assembly of Civil Society dated 18 January 1995. I have also taken into account the expressed intention of URNG to participate in the electoral process, and to do so in conditions of full legality if a peace agreement is signed in due time.

I should like to draw to your attention the importance that the United Nations attaches to the framework agreement and, in particular, to the parties' commitment, in paragraph V (ii) of the framework agreement to the early signing of an agreement for a firm and lasting peace and their undertaking to demonstrate the necessary flexibility for a successful negotiation of the overall agenda. It was precisely in that context that, in his letter of 17 January 1994 to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General informed them of his intention to accept the parties' request to appoint a Moderator for the bilateral talks and to recommend that the United Nations should agree to verify implementation of agreements reached during the peace process.

In that regard, it is necessary to recall the basis on which the Secretary-General decided to recommend to the General Assembly the establishment of MINUGUA before the signing of a final peace agreement. As mentioned in his report to the General Assembly of 18 August 1994 (A/48/985), it was his view that immediate human rights verification could make a decisive contribution to ongoing efforts in Guatemala to end a persisting pattern of human rights abuses. It was also his view that, by promoting the parties' full compliance with the

comprehensive agreement on human rights, the establishment of MINUGUA would strengthen the confidence of the parties and the Guatemalan people as a whole in the agreements reached at the negotiating table and thus consolidate the prospect for an early end to the conflict.

While the presence of MINUGUA is expected to bolster the peace process, it is also clear that the Mission's effectiveness and, indeed, substantive progress in the area of human rights are dependent on progress towards the resolution of the armed confrontation and the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. There is therefore no substitute for the will of the parties to search for a mutually agreeable settlement of the armed confrontation, and to demonstrate the perseverance and flexibility needed to achieve a fair settlement. In our view, a time-frame, which was conceived in the agreement on the timetable as guidance for the negotiating process, remains a useful tool. It is in this spirit that the revised timetable in the appendix is proposed.

The package outlined in the appendix offers, in the Secretary-General's view, the most realistic formula to give the peace talks the new momentum sought by both parties. It takes into account the opportunity for political participation that the upcoming electoral process may offer to URNG, while striving at the same time to ensure that electoral considerations do not affect the negotiations, and particularly the discussion of substantive issues. It seeks to strengthen support for the peace process by all sectors of Guatemalan society. And it would generate further international support for the Guatemalan peace process, and in particular, for the renewal of MINUGUA's mandate.

The Secretary-General would be grateful if you could respond positively to this package within the next seven days. It will be necessary for him to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the basis of answers received from both parties. Should the replies be positive, the Secretary-General would indicate that, in spite of the fact that the time-frame initially envisaged for the conclusion of the negotiations has had to be revised, he would be prepared to continue providing full assistance to the peace process through moderation of the negotiations and verification of all agreements reached. Otherwise, the Secretary-General would have to indicate to the General Assembly and the Security Council that, in his view, the modalities for the participation of the United Nations in the peace process would have to be reconsidered.

I wish in this context to reiterate that the Secretary-General is fully aware of the role that has so far been assigned to the United Nations in moderating the talks between the Government of Guatemala and URNG. At the same time, he views his involvement in this effort as part of his general responsibility, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and long-established practice, to make his good offices available in support of efforts towards peace. It is against this background that he has encouraged the involvement of the United Nations in the present case. In this spirit he believes that he has a broad responsibility, vis-à-vis the Member States, as well as the Guatemalan people, to carry out this mission, as he does in all cases. But he also feels duty-bound to ensure that the proper means are available to carry it out, that the minimum conditions are in place to foster confidence that the effort will succeed, and that there is general agreement

regarding these points amongst all interested parties - for the unity and integrity of the negotiating process must be ensured.

The Secretary-General has therefore asked me to inform you that, once he has received the parties' replies to the proposal in this letter, he proposes to review and assess the nature of the United Nations involvement in the coming stages and that he intends to consult shortly with the parties on this subject.

(Signed) Marrack GOULDING
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

Appendix I

Proposals for the continuation of the negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca submitted to the two parties on 17 February 1995

1. Consideration of the outstanding items on the negotiating agenda would be in accordance with the agreement on a timetable, with the following adjustments to paragraph 1 of that agreement to take account of the delays that have taken place:

1-15 March:	Identity and rights of indigenous peoples
15 March-15 April:	Social and economic issues and the agrarian question
15 April-15 May:	Strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society
15 May-15 June:	Bases for the reintegration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in the political life of Guatemala, and definitive cease-fire
15 June-15 July:	Constitutional reforms and electoral regime
15 July-31 July:	Schedule for the implementation, enforcement and verification of the agreements

2. The target date for the signing of the final peace agreement would therefore be August 1995.

3. With the exception of the dates, all provisions contained in the agreement on the timetable would continue to apply.

4. The revised timetable provides for completion of two main substantive issues (economic and social issues and the agrarian situation; and strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society) before the electoral campaign is fully under way. If complied with, it would also give URNG, if it so chooses, time to participate fully in the electoral process.

5. In the spirit of paragraph 5 of the timetable agreement, which provides that "the parties shall submit their proposals in good time so that the other party can consider them", both parties would submit their proposals on the outstanding items to the Moderator 10 days before the scheduled start of the corresponding round. The Assembly of Civil Society would be invited to submit its documents officially to the parties at dates to be agreed with the Organizing Committee of the Assembly well in advance of the corresponding rounds in order for the parties to be able to take them fully into account in their proposals. The Moderator would prepare drafts to serve as a basis for the negotiations.

6. In order to strengthen the negotiations and promote the continuity of the peace process in Guatemala, it is proposed that political parties that intend to nominate candidates to the elections would be asked to indicate clearly their commitment to the peace process and, in particular, to the implementation of agreements signed between the current Government and URNG. This commitment by the political parties would not substitute for the "national commitments" referred to in the framework agreement, which should result from the deliberations of the Assembly on agreements signed between the parties.

7. With a view to reinforcing the credibility of the peace process, all concerned with the full implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and preparatory work provided under the Agreement on Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer would take action to demonstrate that tangible progress is being made towards that goal. In respect of the responsibility of the United Nations, the Secretary-General would request the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development and a member of the technical committee for resettlement to intensify preparations for the implementation of the resettlement strategy in those aspects which directly concern the United Nations system, and would assign an official to undertake preparatory work for the establishment of the Clarification Commission.

8. In order to provide better information on the advances made in the peace process, the parties and the United Nations would make a concerted effort to ensure that the provisions of agreements already signed and the significance of the peace process should be fully known to all Guatemalans.

9. Both parties would work to undertake confidence-building measures in the area of military operations. This is a delicate task and the United Nations would be prepared to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable definition of actions from which they would refrain. This should not be understood as the definitive cease-fire that both parties agreed to negotiate in due time. These confidence-building measures, which could lead to an informal suspension of offensive military operations, would constitute a demonstration of good will aimed at alleviating the suffering of the civilian population in areas affected by the armed confrontation, protecting human rights and facilitating the work of MINUGUA as well as all national entities devoted to the protection and promotion of human rights.

Annex II

Letter dated 20 February 1995 from the President of Guatemala to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

I have received your letter dated 17 February 1995 and the attached proposal, which I have analysed carefully and closely with the Peace Commission. Before replying to them, I should like to thank you and, through you, all the United Nations staff and officials involved in our peace process for the tremendous amount of effort and work that both documents reflect.

I should like to reiterate my Government's determination to negotiate with all due seriousness and flexibility in order to bring the internal armed conflict to an end as soon as possible. This rapid, affirmative response is evidence of that determination and of our confidence in the role of the United Nations in the negotiations.

During your visit in January, you presented us with a proposal that was more ambitious in terms both of its time-frame, which was considerably shorter, and of its methodology, which envisaged the simultaneous treatment of items. That proposal also took a firmer and more decisive position on the need to take steps to spare the civilian population further suffering.

Our response to that proposal was immediate and favourable and our response to the present proposal is also favourable, although we would have preferred to keep to the original proposal. We respect the United Nations decision to reformulate it, since only you can be the judge of whether the present one is more realistic, having evaluated the objections and observations of the other party. We also accept without comment the fact that you have taken account of views expressed by the Assembly of Civil Society on matters that are outside its jurisdiction, as well as mere statements of intent by URNG which we none the less hope are serious and genuine.

I should like to reiterate that we value MINUGUA tremendously as a product of the negotiations and hope that our Government's affirmative response to this latest proposal will be sufficient for its mandate to be extended, since its verification function is extremely important and its institution-building component, which we hope will soon be activated, is vital for our country.

I feel bound to comment on some aspects of the proposal, although this does not signify any objection to it, the purpose being rather to suggest actions that might help make it viable.

In the first paragraph, you say that the proposed timetable would give URNG, if it so chooses, time to participate fully in the electoral process and to do so on a basis of full legality if the peace agreement is signed in time. Participating fully means being able to set up a political party and participate personally in the electoral process. However, as confirmed by recent statements by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the proposed timetable would not permit this under the electoral legislation currently in force.

A shorter time-frame would have permitted it. However, these obstacles could be overcome by agreeing to amend the constitutional provisions governing elections and by enacting legislation to resolve the personal situation of URNG members once a definitive peace agreement is signed. Let me assure you that the Government is prepared to propose the necessary transitional or definitive amendments to the electoral law and is already working on the various legal formulae which, once the armed conflict is over, would enable URNG members to be reintegrated into society on a basis of full legality and without any restriction on their civil and political rights.

In the second paragraph, you refer to the official submission of the documents of the Assembly of Civil Society in sufficient time for the parties to be able to take them fully into account. I should like to remind you that the parties have in fact had the Assembly's documents since last December, the Assembly having agreed, at the parties' request and through the Moderator, to hand them over precisely so that the parties could consider them. The formality of an official submission should not and cannot be deemed necessary, although this does not mean that the Government does not consider it important. In fact, the Government will approach with all openness the necessary discussion between the parties on how to fill the Assembly's leadership vacuum, since the leadership of the Assembly cannot be assumed simply on the basis of a decision by the Organizing Committee.

In the fifth paragraph, where you mention better information on the advance of the peace process, we consider your reference to a concerted effort to be neither appropriate nor necessary. The Government undertakes, as of now, to conduct a public information campaign so that the population will know more about the negotiating process and the agreements reached and will become involved in their implementation.

Aside from these aspects, on the subject of confidence-building measures, it was our understanding that such measures would apply not just to areas affected by the armed conflict and to the civilian population in those areas, but to the country as a whole and to the civilian population in general.

Lastly, it is our understanding that negotiation of the item "Identity and rights of indigenous people" is to resume on the basis of the second United Nations draft and that the parties cannot present new proposals. It is also our understanding that nothing alters the commitment made under the timetable agreement to sign agreements jointly on the items "Strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society" and "Bases for the reintegration of URNG in the political life of Guatemala and agreement on a definitive cease-fire".

I hope that URNG will also respond favourably and that we will be able to resume negotiations according to the proposed timetable and methodology.

(Signed) Ramiro DE LEON CARPIO

Annex III

Letter dated 24 February 1995 from the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca addressed to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

We thank you for your letter dated 17 February, to which you attached the document entitled "Proposals for the continuation of the negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the URNG", and we reiterate our gratitude for the effort made by the United Nations and your concern that our peace process should regain its momentum.

We have studied the document and its six points carefully and are pleased to inform you that we accept your proposals, subject to the following clarifications:

1. We agree to the establishment of a revised timetable, provided that it guarantees fully that the parties can discuss, analyse and agree on substantive issues without any constraints imposed by time or political will.

2. We see the setting of dates as a guide for our work, a time-frame and a useful tool for giving momentum to the negotiations and to the attainment of satisfactory agreements. In no case can these dates be peremptory.

We therefore reiterate that our approach to the negotiations, within an overall context of flexibility, is based essentially on the content and substance of the agreements, and that this approach must be maintained.

3. We agree that, on the basis of the parties' proposals and the consensus document of the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC), the Moderator should prepare a preliminary draft on each item, to serve as a basis for the negotiations. However, it is our understanding that the draft will be a working paper of the negotiating table.

The parties must take it as such and in that spirit. It cannot be interpreted as a United Nations position and it must be open to comments, analyses and proposals by the parties until such time as a final agreement is reached between them bilaterally.

In this context, it should be reiterated that the role of the United Nations, and the nature of its participation, is to act as moderator. Its power to make proposals falls within that mandate, as established by the framework agreement.

4. As regards the measures proposed to reinforce the credibility of the peace process, we consider that anything to do with the comprehensive agreement on human rights deserves special consideration and attention.

The comprehensive agreement is the only agreement that has been in full force and subject to specific verification for almost a year now, yet the current status of compliance with it - the practical expression of which would

be a marked improvement in respect for human rights in Guatemala - stands in stark contrast to and falls far short of what was agreed.

We value greatly the establishment and deployment of MINUGUA and therefore consider it essential that it remain in the country and that it be strengthened.

5. With regard to military operations, until such time as a cease-fire is agreed to and takes effect, URNG insists on the commitment to respect the provisions of the comprehensive agreement on human rights intended to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population, protect human rights and facilitate the work of MINUGUA and of all national bodies devoted to the protection and promotion of human rights and the rights deriving from international humanitarian law.

As an additional gesture of confidence, URNG offers to suspend acts of sabotage that do not have an impact on the military situation.

It reiterates its willingness to scrupulously observe the commitment on security, so as to guarantee the functioning of MINUGUA.

At the present juncture, it would be very difficult and delicate to make any further statement about military operations.

We reassure you of our readiness to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible and should like to request that the proposed revised timetable take effect as of 15 March.

URNG General Command

(Signed)

Commander Rolando MORÁN

(Signed)

Commander Gaspar ILOM

(Signed)

Commander Pablo MONSANTO

(Signed)

Carlos GONZÁLES
Secretary-General of the
Central Committee of the
Guatemalan Labour Party

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1 March 1995

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LETTER DATED 1 MARCH 1995 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 28 February 1995.

(Signed) Detlev GRAF ZU RANTZAU
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait

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Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, 1/ for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the fifteenth report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines. The preceding reports were submitted on 13 September 1991, 2/ 10 December 1991, 3/ 12 March 1992, 4/ 11 June 1992, 5/ 8 September 1992, 6/ 4 December 1992, 7/ 19 March 1993, 8/ 7 June 1993, 9/ 7 September 1993, 10/ 14 December 1993, 11/ 4 March 1994, 12/ 6 June 1994, 13/ 2 September 1994 14/ and 29 November 1994. 15/

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review no information as requested by paragraph 12 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e., items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. Since the submission of the previous report of the Committee on 29 November 1994, no allegations of violations in connection with paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) have been reported to the Committee.

7. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991, 16/ no further replies have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Notes

1/ S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23279.

4/ S/23708.

5/ S/24083.

6/ S/24545.

7/ S/24912.

8/ S/25442.

9/ S/25930.

10/ S/26430.

11/ S/26874.

12/ S/1994/274.

13/ S/1994/695.

14/ S/1994/1027.

15/ S/1994/1367.

16/ S/22884/Add.2.

UNITED
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S/1995/170
1 March 1995

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LETTER DATED 1 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 28 February 1995 from H.E. Mr. Fares Boueiz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, addressed to you, concerning the naval blockade enforced by Israel on the southern port cities of Lebanon and the continuous Israeli aggression against Lebanon and its citizens.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be distributed urgently as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-05876 (E) 010395 020395

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Annex

Letter dated 28 February 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council

The naval blockade enforced by Israeli naval forces on the port of Tyre has now entered into its third week and has been extended in the last 48 hours to include ports further north on the Lebanese coast such as Sarafand, Sidon and Damour, whereas Israeli naval forces daily patrol the whole length of the Lebanese coast. Meanwhile, bombardments by Israel of villages to the north of areas it occupies in South Lebanon continue unabated and threats by Israeli officials of still worse punishment to befall Lebanon are widely circulated by the media.

The loss of life, the destruction of property, the disruption of the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians living in the western Beqaa and South Lebanon now seriously aggravated by the interdiction imposed by the Israeli naval blockade on thousands of fishermen to carry on their only gainful activity, are all acts of blatant Israeli defiance of the precepts of international law and Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 509 (1982). They are in no way justified by any recent acts of provocation.

Furthermore, the naval blockade now imposed on the southern ports is intended to put new pressure on Lebanon in an attempt to destabilize the country and inhibit the reconstruction programme under way.

Such acts run counter to the interest of the international community and endanger the peace process to which Lebanon is committed.

May I therefore request that all necessary action be taken by the Security Council to bring about the lifting of the illegal blockade of Lebanese ports, the cessation of bombardments of civilians and the respect by Israel of Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and territorial waters in accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 509 (1982).

(Signed) Fares BOUEIZ

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1995/171
2 March 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to our letters addressed to you, the most recent of which was that dated 25 January 1995 (S/1995/77), on the question of the contract awarded by the United Nations to the American company Evergreen, which is known to be connected with the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

I should now like to provide some additional information concerning the relationship of this company with the CIA. On 1 March 1994, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast a television programme about Evergreen that comprised a review of the company's relationship with the CIA and other departments of the United States Government and of the activities in which the company had engaged in their service. In the programme, Ralph Meigy, a former CIA official, said that the aircraft in question has been useful in covert operations for information gathering and the transportation of persons and equipment. He went on to say that whatever cover was used, Postal Service or United Nations, the operation of secret flights under such cover provided a special opportunity, particularly since the United Nations had operations in Somalia and other areas. Thus, the CIA is engaging in covert activities under United Nations cover. It was stated in the programme that Ambassador Madeleine Albright had intervened on five occasions at the United Nations on behalf of Evergreen and that Evergreen had endeavoured to have the United Nations suspend its contracts with the Canadian company SkyLine and award contracts to Evergreen instead.

It was stated in the Canadian television programme that 12 Evergreen employees had been seized during the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. Danny Smith, then a United States Congressman from Oregon (the location of Evergreen corporate headquarters) subsequently stated that the 12 detainees had been on a covert mission and that everyone knew of the relationship between Evergreen and the CIA. In the programme it was stated that Smith, having retired from the House of Representatives, was now a member of the Evergreen board of directors.

I also transmit to you for your perusal a copy of the article by Ian Williams from issue No. 47 of the American periodical CovertAction Quarterly to which I referred in my previous letter. It contains abundant details of the company's relationship with the CIA.

In light of the information previously provided and of this additional information concerning the nature of the relationship between the CIA and Evergreen, which is currently working with the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), we renew our request for your intervention with a view to having the question of the contract with this company reconsidered in order to ensure a continuation of the cooperation that presently obtains between UNIKOM and the Iraqi Government and to prevent the use of this company's aircraft for purposes other than those to which they are assigned.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Enclosure

The UN, the CIA, and Evergreen Air

Ian Williams

In early summer 1993, the United Nations became the site of a procurement dispute that provides a glimpse of the power relations between the world body and its most influential member (and largest debtor), the U.S. The dispute also illustrates the extent of political influence wielded by remnants of the CIA's network of proprietary airlines and the Agency's allies in the "national security" community.



The relationship between the U.S. and the UN has been antagonistic, if not downright hostile, since the '60s when non-aligned nations began asserting their independence from Western domination. With the end of the Cold War, however, the UN's position vis-à-vis the U.S. has become weaker as the U.S. has gained unrivaled political and military (if not economic) supremacy. As a consequence, U.S. policy-makers have tried to treat the organization as just another branch of the national foreign policy apparatus, throwing it a few scraps in the form of back payments when it is properly obeisant and castigating it into submission when it threatens to behave as an independent international forum.[1]

Always ready to seize an opportunity, or manufacture one, the CIA is looking to the UN. Recently, air transport companies with long-standing CIA connections have turned up as contractors for UN peacekeeping missions. Southern Air Transport, which cut its aeronautic teeth in the "secret war" in Southeast Asia, for example, has procured lucrative supply contracts for UNISOM, the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, including one to fly Israeli mineral water from Mogadishu to outlying towns at $30,000 a day.[2] Although Southern Air apparently won the contract legitimately as the lowest bidder, other members of the CIA's air network have shown less concern for such niceties of procurement policy. Evergreen Helicopters, in particular, is embroiled in a scandal complete with an all too familiar cast of right-wing politicians, covert operators, CIA-linked companies, craven bureaucrats, and sleazy international businessmen.

Flying Evergreen's Friendly Skies

Evergreen Helicopters' record reveals more spooks than a haunted house. It is a subsidiary of Evergreen International Aviation, whose corporate headquarters is at McMinnville, Oregon, while its operational headquarters is an Arizona airfield built and paid for by the CIA in the 1970s. A 1979 General Accounting Office report on the field's sale to Evergreen International remains classified but published reports indicate that the company paid $3 million for the lease, and had at least 12 planes and helicopters and a computerized inventory of spare parts, ground equipment, etc.[3] At the same time, Evergreen International bought Intermountain Aviation, which was openly owned by the CIA and had specialized in clandestine drops inside Cuba.[4]

The company's ties to the CIA are not only institutional, but also personal. The revolving door between the CIA and

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Ian Williams is UN correspondent for the *New York Observer*. A former speech writer for British Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock, he has written for *the Independent*, the *Telegraph*, the *Guardian* (all in London), *The Nation*, and many other publications around the world. Map of Evergreen Bases of Operations, Evergreen Annual Report, 1992.

1. Conservative foes of the organization, seeing opportunity in a UN held in financial and political thrall to the U.S., have taken advantage of situations in which pragmatic concerns, especially financial ones, outweigh ideology. For example, a longtime Heritage Foundation associate, Pedro Sanjuan, tried to set up an Institute for East-West Dynamics, enlisting John Bolton, Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. Bolton put pressure on the UN Development Program to make funds available. Although the organizers had originally sought money from the U.S. government, going to the UN had the double advantage of avoiding scrutiny from the Democratic Congress, while allowing Bolton to implicitly threaten to hold up payments due the financially strapped world body. (Ian Williams, "Why The Right Loves the UN," *The Nation*, April 13, 1992.)

2. Mark Fineman, "UN Water Funds go down Drain in Somalia," *Los Angeles Times*, September 27, 1993.

3. James Long and Lauren Cowen, "Missions: The Evergreen Story," *The Oregonian*, August 14, 1988.

4. "In Arizona: A Spymaster Remembered," *Time*, April 7, 1986, pp. 12-13.

/...

its subsidiaries sometimes spins so fast that roles are blurred and the players end up in the same back room. In 1976, George A. Doole, who had managed the entire CIA proprietary fleet until his "retirement" five years earlier, became a director of Evergreen, a post he held until his death in 1985.[5] As the 1976 Church Committee report said of the former CIA air fleet: "Even though formal and informal agency ties are discontinued, social and interpersonal relationships remain. The impact of such liaisons is difficult to assess." Maybe so, but apparently not impossible. The committee concluded that in some cases, "the transfer of the entity was conditioned as an agreement that the proprietary would continue to provide goods and services to the CIA."[6]

Indeed, Evergreen has shown up at the scene of nearly every U.S. policy crisis for the last quarter century. Ironically for a company now seeking UN peacekeeping business in Indochina, Evergreen flew the last helicopters out of Vietnam in 1975. During the 1980 hostage crisis, when it would have been impolitic for the U.S. government itself to do so, Evergreen flew the Shah of Iran from Panama to Cairo for medical treatment.[7] In 1984, the company flew weapons to the Contras in Honduras,[8] and beginning in 1987, the company transported Peruvian troops in anti-drug operations.[9] In El Salvador, during the civil war, it had contracts with the *junta* and then with Duarte to fly workers in armed air convoys to repair power lines sabotaged by the rebels.[10] The company has also openly admitted that it flew a classified mission for the U.S. during the 1989 Panama invasion.[11]



Evergreen Annual Report

Evergreen President Delford M. Smith

While insisting that UN contracts should be up for open bidding, Evergreen was a favorite contractor for "out of channel" trips arranged in haste and sometimes in secret. In 1982, for example, the U.S. Air Force turned to Evergreen to deliver 45 tons of anti-tank ammunition to the Somali government of U.S. ally Siad Barre.[12]

In the past, Evergreen, like other CIA carriers, has won legitimate private business contracts. For example, it has ferried auto parts for Detroit.[13] But it also clearly has an inside track with U.S. government agencies and has shipped cargoes for the Department of Defense and the U.S. Postal Service.

But even those "legitimate" contracts have raised questions. Postal Service auditors complained that a 1987 contract with Evergreen allowed the company to use planes with the Postal Service logo to fly overseas on "humanitarian missions." The auditors also noted that the $68 million contract had bloated to $95 million. The contract had been awarded despite Evergreen's offer being the sixth lowest—$31.4 million more than the lowest bidder—and even though the company had only 14 days in which to build a mail-handling hub.[14] Under a DoDcontract, a 727 ostensibly to be used for the Postal Service was also kept on standby for "special operations"—the emergency transport of U.S. Special Forces to hot-spots. This arrangement netted the company $4 million a year.[15]

Of course, if Evergreen *does* maintain a CIA connection, UN contracts would be a very useful means of gathering intelligence and putting agents into nearly all the world's major trouble spots. It would also be equally advantageous for both the company and *the* Company to use funding sources that would avoid the congressional scrutiny direct CIA contracts might attract.

And Evergreen *needs* the money — from whatever source. It raised $125 million to pay off its more aggressive creditors last October. However, business has been slipping; recently it lost a bid for a billion dollar mail contract to Emery Worldwide Airlines. And last year, Evergreen lost a freight contract with Japan Airlines that accounted for a quarter of its 1992 revenues.[16]

5. James Long and Lauren Cowen, "Buyout From CIA Boosts Evergreen Helicopters," *The Oregonian*, August 15, 1988.
6. United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Final Report: Foreign and Military Intelligence," Book I, Report No. 94-755, 1976, p. 239.
7. Long and Cowen, "Missions...," *op. cit.*
8. *CBS Evening News*, July 7, 1984.
9. Peter Andreas, "U.S. Drug War in Peru," *The Nation*, August 13-20, 1988.
10. Contrato No. CEL-1344 entre Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rió Lempa, December 1, 1981, and Contrato No. CEL-1377 entre Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rió Lempa y Evergreen Helicopters Incorporated, January 31, 1983.
11. "We're Opportunists," *Forbes*, December 10, 1990.
12. Long and Cowen, "Missions...," *op. cit.*
13. Jerry Landauer, "CIA Has Flown Parts From Auto Makers to Assembly Plants," *Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 1979, pp. 1, 25.
14. Long and Cowen, "Missions...," *op. cit.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Jeff Manning, *Portland Business Journal*, April 12, 1992; and Jeff Manning, "Evergreen International Hauling Huge Debt," *Portland Business Journal*, *January 25, 1993.*

Evergreen Goes After the Competition

The Evergreen affair first broke on July 9, 1993, when Evergreen issued charges against eight members of the UN procurement office, which buys goods and services for the peacekeeping operations. Evergreen alleged the UN employees had arranged to deprive the company of its fair share of contracts.[17] The eight, including two Americans and two Canadians, were escorted from their offices and marched past UN security guards, who had instructions to memorize their faces and keep them out. Although not formally charged with anything, the eight were suspended.[18]

Evergreen pointed the finger at a Canadian competitor, SkyLink, accusing it of sabotaging the company's ability to comply with a UN contract in Cambodia. According to a $7 million defamation suit subsequently filed in New Zealand by SkyLink, Evergreen contracted with Pacific Express, a New Zealand air-freight company, to deliver Evergreen's helicopters to Cambodia on May 23. Pacific Express failed to do so. Pacific Express then sent a May 24 fax to Evergreen blaming its failure to deliver the copters on "bribery and corruption" and "commercial sabotage" by "a company located in Canada."[19]

Pacific Express, which had subcontracted the actual piloting of the helicopters to yet another firm, ATLANT, claimed that the unnamed company paid ATLANT's pilots $5,000 to refuse to fly the day before. According to SkyLink's defamation suit, Evergreen then repeated Pacific Express's allegation in a fax to the UN and identified the "company located in Canada" as SkyLink.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

22 November 1989

Mr Don Davis
Project Manager
EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS
PSC Box 5545
APO Miami 34001

Dear Mr Davis

I am extremely pleased to forward the attached letters acknowledging the outstanding support EVERGREEN personnel provided to the Embassy in Paraguay. Your diligent and persistent efforts paid off and resulted in a highly successful mission accomplishment. Please accept my thanks on behalf of the entire 810th Air Division and USSOUTHCOM.

Sincerely

ROBIN C. CORNUM
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

2 Atch
1. AMEMB memo dtd 12 Sep 89
2. USSOUTHCOM memo dtd 30 Oct 89

Evergreen Annual Report

No Reputable Operator

A closer look at the companies involved in the allegations lends credence to SkyLink's denial of wrongdoing. ATLANT, the Russian/Ukrainian company whose pilots refused to fly the helicopters, denies Pacific Express's bribery complaint. ATLANT claims that it refused to fly Evergreen's helicopters because Pacific Express owed them over $500,000 of which they had only been paid $39,000—and 2 Volvos.[20]

ATLANT's credibility appears somewhat better than that of Pacific Express, which was set up by one Shimon Lahav, ne Simon Spitz. In 1986, the Czech-born Spitz was convicted in Germany of embezzlement and remains on Bonn's consular wanted list. In 1989, the Israeli navy intercepted Lahav's boat as he tried to flee to Cyprus to escape his creditors. He moved to Switzerland where the courts in Ticino have suspended the assets of Metro Cargo, a separate company in which he was involved, because of claims by yet another Russian company that it was owed $7 million.[21] There are also allegations that Lahav's planes had been used for arms trading.[22] Last year he turned up in New Zealand where he set up Pacific Express. A New Zealand court has since frozen the company's assets, citing the SkyLink suit and Pacific Express's unpaid debts to ATLANT.[23]

In contrast, senior UN officials involved in the operations in Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia all give high marks to SkyLink, which was founded by Walter Arbib, a Libyan Jew who emigrated to Canada by way of Italy.[24] *UNPROFOR*, the UN peacekeeping force in the Balkans, sent a memo to New York expressing concern that SkyLink might lose the contract. A senior official in Cambodia related only one complaint about Skylink: Its pilots had been wearing shorts.

UN sources said that Skylink had indeed won many contracts, and sometimes lost them—but then had to be asked back because the lowest bidder was incapable of performing. The company uses low-cost Russian helicopters and pilots, both of which were tested in Afghanistan—good training for operating under fire, as many UN operations must.

Regardless of Skylink's good reputation, on June 8, Under Secretary General Melissa Wells, an American, wrote to SkyLink expressing her concern over *safety* and placed a moratorium on new contracts for the company.[25] She did not

17. Julia Preston, "UN Aides Suspended in Probe," *Washington Post*, July 22, 1993.
18. Four months after the suspension, the UN finally acted. Despite the suspended officials' "exhaustive rebuttals" of the allegations, three were reprimanded, one was cleared of any wrongdoing, and four have been ordered to face administrative hearings on the charges. Julia Preston, "UN Aides Probed in Contracts," *Washington Post*, November 19, 1993, p. A46
19. Fax from Pacific Express to Evergreen Helicopters dated May 24, 1993.
20. Interview with the author, September 1993.
21. Paul Pankhurst, "The Take Off and Crash Landings of Simon Lahav," *The Auckland Independent* (New Zealand), July 30, 1993.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Interviews with the author, August and September 1993.
25. These charges have a certain irony. In January 1993, the U.S. took $243,000 in civil penalties against Evergreen for flying an allegedly unairworthy 747 on 18 flights in 1990. The same month, a federal judge suspended the award of a smaller Postal Service contract to Evergreen because of its "dangerously low staffing levels," and because its low bid was based upon proposed wages which violate applicable U.S. Department of Labor wage laws. It later regained the contract in an out of court settlement. *Indianapolis Business Journal*, February 1, 1993, cited in a confidential credit report on Evergreen.

mention the bribery allegations that precipitated the New Zealand case. Interestingly, the suspected "unsafe" company was asked to continue flying all its existing contracts. Soon, however, SkyLink discovered that its bills were not being paid. It wrote to the UN pointing out that if the $20 million outstanding were not forthcoming, it would have to stop operations.

The United Nations blustered that this was a threat—but paid at the end of July. By then the eight procurement office employees had been suspended for two weeks. The UN broke the news of that and the Skylink "threat" simultaneously in an apparent attempt to justify its precipitate actions.

Challenging the UN's Assertions

The Canadian government supports SkyLink's contention that it was set up by its U.S. competitor. It also is deeply disturbed by the treatment of Canadians who were among the suspended UN staffers. Canada is among the few nations to have paid its dues in full — and indeed often in advance to help the UN because countries such as the U.S. are perennially in arrears. The Canadians also contribute troops to almost all UN peacekeeping forces — for which they are owed $317 million — so one of their companies being muscled out by the UN's biggest debtor does not please them. Expressing her exasperation, then Prime Minister Kim Campbell told a press conference at the UN on September 28th that "[a]n unacceptable cloud" hangs over the suspended Canadian nationals. "I hope it will be resolved very soon," she concluded.[26]

Colleagues of the eight suspended men also defend the judgement call that Evergreen would not be able to perform.[27] They were part of a department which was responsible for everything from toilet paper to tankers, from handkerchiefs to helicopters for the 14 UN peacekeeping operations and their 90,000 personnel. The budget they administer had increased 1,500 percent, while staff levels had barely risen. To keep the peacekeeping operations going, they worked 12 hours a day and weekends. The eight are understandably resentful about the shabby way they have been treated.[28]

A senior peacekeeping official who requested confidentiality is convinced of the eight's innocence. "If there was [sic] the slightest proof that these people benefited personally," he said, "I'd be in favor of coming down heavily. But the problem is the antiquated system of decision making and the pressures that mean everything has to be done yesterday. These are the people who tried to bridge the gap, who tried to get the job done. If they had gone by the book, every operation would have been in serious trouble."[29]

Indeed, UN sources revealed that after repeated attempts to get temporary staff replacing the eight to sign documents which would implicate SkyLink, the only person prepared to substantiate any complaints was a UN employee of less than two months, Michael Timpani. UN sources suggest that Timpani's appointment was the result of intervention by high officials in the General Secretariat who needed someone to advance their agenda in the Evergreen affair.[30]

With Friends Like These

Timpani's own résumé suggests that he is not particularly qualified for an organization officially dedicated to world peace. As one expert said when he read it, "This guy is bragging of being involved in every failed [covert] operation in the last ten years!"[31]

Timpani boasts of flying missions for the Contras, and of his work with GeoMilitech, the company which reportedly helped arm the Contras in violation of U.S. and international law.[32] Indeed, GeoMilitech under Lt. Col. Oliver North's willing point man, John Singlaub, seemed to be trying to offer one-stop arms shopping to the CIA in its work around the world, from Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, to the Philippines.[33]

In a similar vein, Timpani's résumé also claims a consultancy with the World Anti-Communist League, and work with the military "Security Group" in the Philippines from 1986 to 1987 —just about the time that right-wing death squads there began to wander around with sophisticated American weaponry.[34] He also claims to have worked for the BETAC Corporation, which is tied so closely to the Pentagon and allied agencies that 92 percent of its employees have Top Secret clearance and 45 percent have even higher clearance.[35] Timpani only boasts a "Secret" classification. With a background like Timpani's, arguments favoring Evergreen should be taken with a grain of salt.

The U.S. Mission to the Rescue

So who was pulling the strings? First, the U.S. Mission intervened at least five separate times for Evergreen Helicopters, which incidentally donated $85,000 in soft money to the Republicans in 1988.[36] Mission officials say they were merely acting to protect the interests of an American company. However,

26. Within days of taking office, the new Canadian Foreign Minister, Andre Ouellet, sent a letter to Boutros Boutros Ghali demanding action to allow SkyLink to bid on the next round of contracts. UN officials refused to reopen SkyLink's bids and, amazingly enough, all the lowest bids were from Evergreen. There has since been a storm of protest from other companies involved.
27. A U.S. military officer assigned to work with UN procurement stated in a confidential memo that he did not "notice any fraud and abuse or impropriety from any individuals involved in these cases," and cited a contested bid for which Evergreen itself admitted that it could not deliver the helicopters at the time and place specified. Confidential UN internal report.
28. Interestingly, UN procurement office head Per Sjogren, who signed many of the documents, received the posting he wanted to a similar position in Geneva, and no action was taken against the senior officials on the contracts committee who approve all deals. A colleague of the suspended men explained to the author that "Sjogren was in the unique hierarchical structure of the UN which leaves all decisions to the underlings. When something works, they take the credit. When it goes wrong, they wash their hands of it."
29. Interview with the author, September 1993.
30. Interviews with the author, September 1993.
31. Interview with the author, September 1993.
32. Adele Oltman and Dennis Bernstein, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," *CAIB*, Spring 1988, pp. 18-20.
33. Holly Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), pp. 235-36.
34. Oltman and Bernstein, *op. cit.*
35. Louis Wolf, "Refurbishing Special Operations for the 1990s," *CAIB*, Fall 1992, pp. 20-25.
36. Charles R. Babcock, "Big Donations A Campaign Staple," *Washington Post*, November 17, 1988.

given the unusual personal intervention of U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright, the official explanation of "business as usual" rings false. Albright wrote to one U.S. senator to assure him that an investigation into unfair allocation of contracts was under way. UN officials have also been vociferous in their verbal accusations against SkyLink.

Beside official U.S. and UN pressure on Evergreen's behalf, there is at least one member of the U.S. Mission who has unofficial contacts to anti-UN senators, such as Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), and who has been bypassing official channels and providing slanted material. Such leaks came to the ears of *Sixty Minutes*, which was investigating alleged waste and corruption at the UN. The threat of the investigation terrified senior UN officials, and Under Secretary General Wells issued a memo ordering staff to refuse to talk to the press.

Nonetheless, after three months of intensive investigation, not one substantiated complaint had been made against the eight suspended employees, or against the Canadian firm. Also, Skylink President Walter Arbib told *CAQ* on October 1 that there had not been a single direct accusation made to the company on this matter by the United Nations.

America's UN Mission is apparently working with right-wing congressmembers and old friends of the CIA to ensure a place at the table for covert operators.

Dirty Doings at Turtle Bay

If there have been no direct accusations — let alone substantiated charges —why then has the UN hierarchy acted to suspend the eight staff members and place a moratorium on SkyLink? One explanation is that Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's office panicked after it heard that the *Sixty Minutes* investigation was on to the Evergreen allegations, and that the U.S. Congress was threatening to withhold funds if U.S. corporations were not treated fairly.[37] Boutros Ghali set a compatriot, Mohamed Niazi, on the SkyLink trail as special auditor and ordered the immediate suspension of the eight to show that he was cleaning house.[38] Niazi is the official named by UN sources as the likely sponsor of the spook Timpani's appointment.

At an August 25 UN press conference, *CAQ* asked Niazi why his report on the eight had inaccurately claimed that Evergreen had the bulk of the UN helicopter contracts before 1989. Abandoning his usual precision, he waffled: "It was just that Evergreen had a certain amount of work, and SkyLink had this amount of work, and subsequently Evergreen got this amount of work and SkyLink got that amount of work."

Insiders now estimate that the United Nations has overpaid around $10 million for air contracts in the last few months because officials directly responsible to Boutros Ghali—namely Melissa Wells and Mohamed Niazi—determined to exclude SkyLink. In September, the UN promulgated a new policy. Rather than allowing brokers—who are usually quicker and cheaper—to bid for air transport contracts, it would limit contracts to owner-operator companies such as Evergreen. The very first application of the policy cost the UN an extra $100,000. Ironically, it turned down a bid by New York-based Airline Cargo Services in favor of one by Aeroflot. Unlike Evergreen, Airline Cargo Services has no known links to the CIA. The U.S. Mission failed to intercede on behalf of this firm.

Needless to say, no questions were asked when the same procurement department, under orders from above ignored a $650,000 bid by a private company to fly Polish peacekeepers to Cambodia, and gave a $2.5 million contract to the U.S. Department of Defense.[39]

UN Role in the New World Order

The entire Evergreen affair leaves an unsavory aftertaste. Not only has the UN Secretariat buckled under in the face of U.S pressure, but the U.S. Mission in New York is apparently working with right-wing congressmembers and old friends of the CIA to ensure a place at the table for covert operators.

U.S. foes of the UN charge that the organization is not accountable to the American taxpayer. It isn't, nor as an international body, should it be. Now, however, it is being micromanaged by precisely those sections of the U.S. government that have themselves proven unaccountable to Congress and taxpayers. The whole Evergreen affair tends to confirm the worst fears about the New World Order. The spectacle of important sections of the UN Secretariat scuttling spinelessly to do the bidding of the intelligence apparatus of one member government is not an edifying one. •

37. In June, the Senate Appropriations Committee attached an amendment to the current UN appropriations bill that would require the Secretary of State to certify that U.S. companies had received a fair chance at UN contracts before any of the $835 million U.S. debt would be paid.

38. UN staffers suggest that Niazi wants the Inspector General's post which the U.S. is urging the UN to create. Washington would doubtless have a large say in the appointment, so catching UN staff members who deprived a U.S. company with influential friends of its rights would not be unhelpful for Niazi's career plans. The UN revealed that Niazi had recently earned over $100,000 on special contracts while drawing his UN pension. Staff rules require retirees' pensions suspended if they return to work for the organization for more than six months. Fortuitously, Niazi's previous two contracts were each for one day under six months. Now, however, he will indeed give up his pension since on August 24 he was appointed Assistant Secretary General for Inspections and Investigations.

39. Ian Williams, "Sex Harassment Claim Rocks UN Agency," *New York Observer*, September 28, 1992.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1995/172
2 March 1995
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LETTER DATED 1 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 28 February 1995 from Mr. Hamid Yusuf Hammadi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 28 February 1995 from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to inform you that senior Kuwaiti government officials have on more than one occasion assumed positions that indicate their lack of respect for the norms of international intercourse and the provisions of Security Council resolutions requiring respect for Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, namely resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991). Such positions have been maintained even with Iraq's recognition on 10 November 1994, in accordance with Security Council resolution 833 (1993), of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and of the international boundaries as demarcated by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission.

In our letter of 15 February 1995 addressed to you concerning the Iranian aggression of 11 February 1995, we referred to the close coordination prior to this operation between circles that are well known to be clients of the rulers of Iran and Kuwaiti government officials. The aggression took place within a few days of the visit to Kuwait of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the so-called "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq", which is based in Tehran, and of his meeting with the Amir, the Prime Minister and senior officials. This is to be regarded as open intervention by the Government of Kuwait in Iraq's internal affairs and a measure that has the avowed objective of undermining the country's internal stability. It is said that, following a previous visit to Kuwait in 1992, this person declared that he had discussed with Kuwaiti officials "ideas" relating to a plan to depose Saddam Hussein.

I should like to cite some of the statements made by senior government officials in Kuwait calling directly or indirectly for the removal of the political regime in Iraq and for interference in the country's internal affairs:

1. In a statement published on 21 November 1994 in the Egyptian weekly Rose al-Yusif, Su'ud al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Information, said, "The Iraqi regime cannot be trusted, and we must all work together for its removal".

2. On 21 November 1994, Mr. Muhammad al-Sabah, Ambassador of Kuwait to the United States, made a statement to the California newspaper The Los Angeles Times, reported in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasah on 23 November 1994, in which he said, "The departure of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would change much in the region, particularly since he does not have the popularity to survive for long".

3. On 17 January 1995, Agence France-Presse reported that on 16 January 1995 the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Saad Al-Abdulla, had stated that, "The reunification of Iraq comes about through the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq".

These expressed positions, a few examples of which I set before you, reflect the true nature of the policy being pursued by the Government of Kuwait in seeking to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and to interfere openly in its internal affairs. They constitute a flagrant violation of Kuwait's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the norms of international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hamid Yusuf HAMMADI
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/49/858
S/1995/173
2 March 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 74
PROTECTION AND SECURITY
OF SMALL STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 2 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, containing the Montevideo Declaration that was signed in Montevideo on 28 February 1995 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru and the representatives of the four Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942. The Declaration reaffirms the cease-fire agreement reached between Ecuador and Peru on 17 February 1995 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 74, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Luis VALENCIA RODRIGUEZ
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Press release issued on 28 February 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador announced that, following a lengthy meeting held today, 28 February 1995, in Montevideo, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, together with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru, signed the Montevideo Declaration, in which they emphasized their political will to promote the peace process and the cessation of hostilities in the conflict between the two countries, in accordance with the Itamaraty Declaration, which was signed on 17 February 1995.

The text of the Montevideo Declaration is as follows:

"The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, meeting in Montevideo on 28 February 1995, held talks with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru, as a result of which:

"1. The Parties thank the Guarantor Countries for their initiative to hold this meeting in Montevideo, which demonstrates their readiness to engage in a constructive dialogue with a view to consolidating peace through the full implementation of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration of 17 February 1995 in a spirit of goodwill and confidence-building.

"2. The Parties reiterate their commitment to the immediate and effective cease-fire established in the Declaration.

"3. The Parties express their thanks for the initiative of the Guarantor Countries to arrange for the immediate dispatch of their observers or representatives to the area, which will permit the supervision of the cease-fire and the concentration of forces in the previously agreed points (Ccangos and PV1).

"4. The Guarantor Countries reiterate their commitment to continue to carry out their obligations under the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which will help bring the Parties together and contribute to the full consolidation of peace between Ecuador and Peru.

"Montevideo, 28 February 1995.

"(Signed)	Galo LEORO F. Ecuador	(Signed)	Efraín GOLDEMBERG Peru
"(Signed)	Guido DI TELLA Argentina	(Signed)	Luis Felipe LAMPREIRA Brazil
"(Signed)	José Miguel INSULZA Chile	(Signed)	Alexander WATSON United States of America"

The Government of Ecuador takes this opportunity to declare once again that, in keeping with its dedication to peace, it remains willing to observe the agreed cease-fire and hopes that the Government of Peru will honour the commitment that it assumed when it signed the Itamaraty Declaration.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/174
2 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1995 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am writing to you concerning the declaration by the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group dated 22 February 1995 contained in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council on 24 February 1995 (S/1995/159) and, upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

The declaration contains a series of absurd, groundless and utterly tendentious allegations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its consistent policy of peace, which it pursues with a view to resolving the crisis in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The appeal by the OIC Contact Group to terminate immediately the measures contained in Security Council resolution 970 (1995) concerning the easing of certain sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of "evidence of violations of the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" is outrageous and is in direct contravention to the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Co-Chairmen have already certified in five monthly reports that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is continuing to meet its commitment to close its border with the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. It has also been confirmed that the Yugoslav authorities are fully cooperating with the humanitarian mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia concerning the situation on the border.

Instead of offering its support for the constructive policy and serious efforts that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is investing with a view to resolving the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are widely acknowledged, the OIC Contact Group goes so far as to make the outrageous claim that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "still carries the overwhelming burden for aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Hezegovina" and even accuses Yugoslavia of committing genocide.

It is generally accepted by the international community that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a party to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it has done its utmost to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan of the international Contact Group, which it regards as a solid foundation for peace.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has consistently maintained that it has absolutely no territorial claims as regards any of the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adheres to the principled position that the recognition of the secessionist republics can only be attained when the political issues among their constituent nations are resolved.

It is indeed regrettable that the OIC Contact Group does not utilize in the right way its undoubted political potential and that it gives evidence by producing such political pamphlets that its exclusive goal is to satisfy its current political propaganda needs and not to contribute in this very vital and sensitive moment to an urgent achievement of a political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced that instead of leading a hysterical anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian campaign it would be much more useful for the OIC Contact Group to try really to help in the achievement of an urgent end to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by making an effort to convince the Bosnian Muslims of the futility of pursuing the war option and of the need to revert to negotiations on the basis of full equality and respect of the vital interests of the three constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/175
2 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report which was addressed to me on 1 March 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994 and paragraph 5 of Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995. In those resolutions the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

2. It will be recalled that on 4 August 1994 the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the 'Republika Srpska';

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republika Srpska', except food, clothing and medicine."

3. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994, and 5 January and 2 February 1995, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372; S/1995/6; S/1995/104). The report dated 2 February 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

> "In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces."

In a supplementary note provided to the Security Council on 7 February 1995, the Co-Chairmen stated as follows:

> "The 30-day report from the Co-Chairmen covered a period of only 19 days under resolution 970 (1995) and this is why they did not change the certification wording on this occasion. They are, however, ready to certify that during the last 30-day period from 2 to 31 January based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or national technical means, there were no transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Developments in the past 30 days are dealt with below.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

4. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border with the Bosnian Serbs continues in force.

5. On 13 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Director of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. M. Kertes, about the control of buses. It was agreed that all buses must be partially checked and that the longer-distance shopping type buses must be thoroughly checked at a minimum level of 20 per cent. It was also agreed that buses based in the "Republika Srpska" with additional fuel tanks will not be allowed to enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Similarly, buses based in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will not be allowed to enter the "Republika Srpska" with fuel in additional tanks. The Mission Coordinator considers this to be a very tight level of control. The 20 per cent goal of examinations is still to be attained at some border crossing points.

6. The Mission has received from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the following analysis of confiscations by them along the border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period from 4 August 1994 to 31 January 1995.

Goods	At the border crossing points	Elsewhere	Total
Petrol	21.9 tons	23.5 tons	45.4 tons
Diesel	16.4 tons	283.1 tons	399.5 tons
Cigarettes	0.805 tons	43.3 tons	44.1 tons
Construction material	-	161.2 tons	161.2 tons
Wood construction material	-	11.1 cu m	11.1 cu m
Alcohol	326 litres	3 824 litres	4 150 litres
Foodstuff	10 kg	9.5 tons	9.5 tons
Textiles/clothing/footwear	120 kg	9.9 tons	10 tons
Livestock	-	37	37
Other goods	15 tons	36.6 tons	51.6 tons

7. In 138 cases during the above-mentioned period (4 August 1994-31 January 1995), violations resulted in administrative fines or prosecutions. A system has now been established to provide the categories of confiscations and offences on a monthly basis which can be used for comparison purposes. This analysis also includes the Nudo valley incident at the end of December 1994. The Mission Coordinator hopes to obtain these figures separately. Warrants for the arrest of the Nudo valley organizers have been issued.

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

8. As at 1 March 1995, 189 international Mission personnel were on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

9. A provisional border crossing point at Nudo valley was activated on a 24-hour basis effective from 7 February. Better weather conditions over the Podgora mountains allowed the remanning of the Sula border crossing point in Sector Bravo on 9 February. The Mission is now covering 21 border crossings 24 hours a day. Of those, 2 are train stations.

10. The Mission headquarters has been reorganized. The senior staff includes two senior advisers, one for political issues who is also deputy to the head of mission and one for customs policy matters who is also special envoy to the Montenegrin Government. The rest of the headquarters personnel is divided between the operations department and the administrative department. Standard operating procedures have been written to provide the Mission monitors with guidelines, ensuring that tasks and duties are dealt with in a uniform, standard and professional manner.

11. The UHF radio network installation has been completed in the area of operations of sectors Belgrade and Alpha. Work is under way in the remaining sectors.

A. Auditing of the Mission's accounts

12. Appendix I to the present report contains a summary of the finances made available to the Mission up to 28 February 1995. The accounts of the Mission are currently being audited by an independent accounting firm. The initial audit will cover the period from 17 September 1994 until 9 January 1995 and the results will be made known.

B. Additional observers needed by the Mission

13. The approved budget of the Mission for the period from 1 December 1994 to 31 May 1995 is US$ 3.1 million, based on 170 observers, 85 interpreters and 85 vehicles. Contributions received to date are only US$ 1.1 million. Based on previous patterns, there are uncertainties about payment from some countries, estimated at $0.7 million, leaving the Mission with an estimated expected amount of $1.3 million until the end of May. With the target of 225 observers, the subsequent requirement for additional funding for the period is estimated at $2,245,000, leaving the Mission with an under-funding of $945,000 for the next three months, assuming that expected payments are actually made, and on time.

14. Unless the assessed funds arrive shortly, particularly from the main contributors, the Mission may well have to cease operation and terminate within the month. Without the approval and receipt of the needed additional funding of $945,000, it will not be able to sustain the operation until the end of May.

15. The Mission strength as of the date of this report is 189 international observers. It is expected that this number will increase to approximately 225, including the impending arrival of some 20 observers from the United States, 5 from the Russian Federation and 2 from the United Kingdom. Provided that these members join the Mission, it will be able to cope with its current tasks and duties. However, even with these additions unusually heavy demands will still be made on Mission personnel, who are currently working an average of 12 hours daily, 6 to 7 days a week.

16. Having also evaluated staffing levels required to meet its obligations, the Mission would require an additional 25 observers, bringing the total number of monitors to 250 with a corresponding increase in the number of interpreters and vehicles. The incremental cost of adding these additional members is estimated at $200,000 for a three-month period.

17. The following is a table of funding requirements until 31 May 1995:

		United States dollars
-	Operating funds from March to May: $500,000 x 3 months	1 500 000
-	Termination costs	70 000
-	Improvement of border control points working conditions from caravans to portacabins	200 000
-	Payment of outstanding obligations	250 000
-	Cost of pledged staffing: 190 to 225 monitors	225 000
	Total funds required, March-May	2 245 000
	Current funding of the Mission: (not including voluntary start-up contributions)	
	Assessed contributions	3 130 000
Less:	Contingencies for non/late payment of assessed contributors a/	(700 000)
	Assessed contributions received	(1 130 000)
	Expected payment of assessments until the end of May	1 300 000
	Supplementary funds required	945 000
Plus:	Funds required to increase staffing from 225 to 250	200 000
Total supplementary funds required from participating States		1 145 000

a/ Certain contributing States have developed a pattern of non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions.

A summary showing the current status of contributions is presented in appendix II to the present report.

C. Question of an aerial component for the Mission

18. As will be related in section VII below, alleged helicopter incidents between 1 and 4 February have attracted a great deal of publicity. This raises the issue of whether the Mission should be provided with an aerial component.

19. Radar coverage of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the "Republika Srpska" from Surcin extends as far as the Montenegrin border under optimum conditions. The ability to detect

helicopters is dependent upon several factors: height and size of target, weather returns, terrain and the tuning and power of the radar equipment.

20. In addition to the acceptance by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to permit unimpeded access for United Nations military observers (UNMOs) to existing facilities (which would be in the interest of the desire of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to confirm their total closure of the "Republika Srpska" border), further means could be employed to achieve increased certainty of coverage:

- By employment of a NATO airborne sensor, either fixed-wing or helicopter;

- Through the use of mobile radar facilities placed at optimum positions along the border.

21. The Mission's understanding is that AWACS are primarily tasked to watch for fixed-wing violations, the lower detection threshold of their radar being set above that of a slow-moving helicopter. This is to avoid the clutter of additional targets that fast-moving road vehicles would produce.

22. Should an airborne watch be preferred, then there are a number of aircraft besides AWACS that could be considered. Specialist advice would need to be sought to determine how this can be achieved.

23. Alternatively, mobile low-altitude radar systems could be employed. This is sophisticated, complex equipment, which the Mission does not have the technical means to operate and support. A number of radars would be required to cover the length of the border. As the latter is in a predominantly mountainous region, radars would have to be accurately sited to ensure total coverage of the numerous valleys and ridges that exist. Each unit would likely consist of a radar head, power plant, control room communications, accommodation and a staffing by up to 50 technicians, supported by an extensive logistical and administrative structure.

24. In the opinion of the Mission, the cost of a mobile radar operation, in terms of both manpower and equipment would be high and the Mission Coordinator therefore recommended to the Co-Chairmen that the UNMO system already in place - with the specific assurances from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of unhindered access to the radar screens - should continue verification of Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

25. In the absence of any evidence of helicopters flying from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Co-Chairmen do not recommend that scarce resources for the Mission be expended for radar equipment to monitor helicopter flights but instead that Governments should meet their financial obligations and provide the resources needed to allow the number of Mission observers to rise to 250 with increased mobile patrolling, and that the UNMO system already in place should continue its monitoring of the airspace.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

26. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

27. On 3 February, threats were heard by the Chief of Police at Sremska Raca against Mission observers. The threats were coming from the "Republika Srpska" side. In the evening the police were seen to be carrying rifles and wearing flack jackets and helmets. Also, Sector Alpha reported that the situation at Badovinci was tense during the first week of February and the locals were becoming angry with the customs, police and Mission observers. Tensions subsided later, but Mission staff are alert for any recurrence.

28. A shooting incident occurred on 14 February in the north of Section Charlie in Montenegro. Upon return from a foot patrol near the Bosnian border, the personnel went into their vehicle and proceeded to return to Pluzine along the same unimproved dirt road it had used to reach its dismount point. After driving 500 metres, the vehicle approached a number of large rocks which ineffectively blocked the road. The observers got out of their vehicle and as they began to move the rocks a weapon report rang out. The next report was preceded by the sound of an impact within metres of the patrol's general location and was considered a good indication that the rifle fire was purposely aimed in the direction of the patrol. During the four minutes required to hastily move the rocks, five rifle reports were heard. An unknown individual pointing a hunting rifle at the patrol was spotted. All Mission personnel and equipment evacuated the area without damage or injury and proceeded to the Pluzine police station to inform the local authorities. It is the patrol's general impression that the incident was not designed to inflict physical harm on Mission members even though the circumstances were characteristic of an ambush.

29. On 15 February, the Mission Coordinator's Special Envoy (a member of the patrol involved in the shooting incident) and two other members of the patrol were invited to meet the Interior Minister of Montenegro. The Deputy Interior Minister and the Chief of the Niksić Police, together with his deputy, were also present. The shooting incident was discussed in some detail: a 17-year-old youth had been arrested. He had admitted firing in the area at the time and the place of the incident, but stated that he was not aware of the patrol's presence and that Mission involvement was purely an accident. He will be charged with possessing a firearm under age and without a licence, and for firing in an area likely to endanger life. His elder brother, who legally owns the gun, may also face prosecution. The Mission Coordinator has passed his commendation to the Montenegrin authorities for their prompt and effective action in this matter.

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

30. In the assessment of the Mission Coordinator, the cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be satisfactory.

31. On 6 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator, together with his Senior Political Advisor, Special Envoy and Press Officer, met with the President of Montenegro, Mr. Bulatović; the Commander of the Second Army, General Babić; and the Commander of the Herzeg Novi Military District, Admiral Zeć. They all reaffirmed their commitment to continue the high level of cooperation with the Mission and the effective closure of the border between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 22 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator paid a courtesy call on President Milošević.

32. In the assessment of the Mission Coordinator, at most border crossing points, the level of customs inspection of vehicles is good. Customs officials are confiscating goods which have not been declared prior to the vehicles being examined and are turning away vehicles trying to cross the border several times per day. The amount of fuel confiscated seems to be increasing. Customs at Sremska Raca has informed the Mission that, on average, contraband valued at DM 60,000 is seized at the border crossing point each week. This excludes the value of any fuel confiscated.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

33. The operating principle of the Mission is to base itself on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate.

34. The Mission Coordinator has received information from different sources that there might be an underwater oil pipeline across the Drina river. No exact location of this possible pipeline has been given. Mission mobile patrols have been searching for any sign of a pipeline on the banks of the Drina, but no signs of it have been discovered.

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

35. The Mission now covers 21 major crossings 24 hours a day. Appendix III to the present report contains a comprehensive and updated list of border crossings between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. No-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina

36. The alleged helicopter incidents between 1 and 4 February, in particular the reported sightings of 15 to 20 helicopters near Srebrenica on 3 February, have been thoroughly investigated. There has been no confirmation of any helicopters crossing the border either from NATO or national Governments during this period, nor from UNMOs in a position to monitor the airspace through their presence in the radar control room at Surcin airport, Belgrade. Between 2 and 15 February, the UNMOs were denied the facility to watch over a local radar operator but were not banned from the radar room itself. When the Co-Chairmen,

Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, met President Milošević in Belgrade on 15 February to discuss wider questions, they asked him to make more information available for the days of the alleged helicopter sightings and on the capabilities of the radar at Surcin. That same afternoon they were informed that the Chief UNMO in Belgrade had been called in to review the tapes.

37. The Mission Coordinator subsequently reported to the Co-Chairmen that after reviewing the radar tapes for the days in question, the UNMOs had found nothing except one approved MEDEVAC flight which was observed by a Mission team at Ljubovica. Nine reports from the Srebrenica area from the period from 1 to 4 February were evaluated. The radar tapes were evaluated 10 minutes before and 10 minutes after each actual report. The review was carried out by UNMO air traffic controllers in good cooperation with, and support from, the local representatives of the Surcin airport authorities and the Yugoslav Air Force liaison officer. Of the nine reports only the third report showed a short track which covered an approved MEDEVAC helicopter flight from Batajnica to Pale. The observers of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia at Ljubovica observed a helicopter at the expected travel time, and the timings also fit in with the ground operations done at Srebrenica. The conclusion was therefore that the radar track did not indicate a border-crossing violation and the flight was not a ground-observed violation.

38. In meetings with the Mission Coordinator, on 8 and 13 February, Mr. Kertes, the Head of the Customs Authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), categorically denied involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in any of the alleged helicopter flights near Srebrenica. He also vigorously rejected suggestions that "Republika Srpska" helicopters could have crossed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), stating that instructions had been given to shoot down any "Republika Srpska" helicopter that might try to cross the border. The Mission also held meetings on Tuesday, 14 February, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at Belgrade, and on 15 February a mission operations officer was in attendance at a meeting between the representatives of UNPROFOR and air traffic control personnel at Surcin. The Coordinator of the Mission has checked repeatedly with Mission monitors along the border in the most likely areas of possible crossing and none has either seen or heard any helicopters crossing the border during that period. The Coordinator of the Mission has double-checked with heads of Mission sectors Alpha and Bajina Basta, both of whom reaffirmed that none of their observers saw or heard any helicopters near to or crossing the border between Serbia and the "Republika Srpska" during the dates or times in question. On 17 February, the Mission Coordinator met with the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Bjelica, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Kovacević and the Commander of the First Army, General Ojdanić. They all categorically denied any involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in any of the flights near Srebrenica. On 22 February, President Milošević also assured the Mission Coordinator that no helicopters from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were involved.

39. At the meeting with the Mission Coordinator, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) requested that the results of the investigations into the alleged helicopter incidents should be made known at the

highest level where the accusations against them were originally made. They also requested assistance from UNPROFOR and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to unlock blocked overseas accounts in order to enable procurement of radar equipment spare parts.

40. It will be recalled that, following negotiations between the then Co-Chairmen, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and the then Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and in particular President Cosić and Prime Minister Panić, an agreement was signed on 2 November 1992 between General Zivota Panić, CGS JA, and Lt. General Satish Nambiar, Force Commander UNPROFOR, concerning access to the airfields at Surcin and Batajnica (Belgrade), Podgorica (Montenegro), Pristina (Kosovo) and Kraljevo (now closed). It also included access to Nis, Ponikve (10 kilometres south-east of Bajina Basta) and Berane (formerly Ivangrad, in Montenegro). Currently, UNMO controllers are based at Surcin (Belgrade) whilst airfield monitors are deployed at the Batajnica, Podgorica, Ponikve and Pristina airfields.

41. When NATO began to police the no-fly zone around March 1993, they tried to stop helicopter flights as well as the flying of fixed-wing aircraft. Whereas under the voluntary agreement fixed-wing flying stopped, helicopter flying began to build up and NATO aircraft, despite taking action to force down some helicopters, soon found that helicopter violations continued regardless of their actions. There have been in total 3,936 violations since April 1992. The violations are broken down as follows: 14 per cent for the Croats, 33 per cent for the Bosnians, 46 per cent for the Serbs and 7 per cent unknown.

42. At the meeting on 15 February between the air traffic control authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), representatives from UNPROFOR and the Mission, full access for the UNMOs was restored with an improvement in availability of facilities being assured. The Mission Coordinator has reported that at that meeting it was confirmed by the civil aviation authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that UNMOs would be assured full and unimpeded admission to the ATC radar room at Surcin airport and the sole use of a free radar scope. The voice and radar tapes would also be made available for analysis by the UNMOs. In fact, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) requested that UNMOs should review the tapes for the whole period to avoid any further accusations or suspicions.

43. From the Mission's point of view, with the lack of any confirmation, or of visual or other evidence, it has concluded that there is no evidence that the helicopters sighted near Srebrenica came from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In its resolution 781 (1992), the Security Council gives the mandate for UNPROFOR to monitor compliance of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), this is done by UNMOs consisting of 5 controllers and 16 airfield monitors tasked to report on violations of the no-fly zone.

B. Other issues

44. On 1 February, the ferry at Jamena was loaded on trucks parked on the "Republika Srpska" side of the river. The motor boat has also been removed. The Colonel in charge of the military in the vicinity of Jamena and Sremska Raca said that the Yugoslav Army is increasing the number and size of its patrols in the area. The military accompanied the Mission's mobile observer team in the area on 4 February in full-body armour and with rifles - which had not been done hitherto.

45. Near Jamena a Yugoslav Army patrol in mid-February caught two smugglers, with 43 boxes of cigarettes and DM 8,000. One smuggler managed to escape. All the goods were confiscated. In order to suppress smuggling, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) occasionally saturate areas along the Drina with Yugoslav Army ambushes, irregular guard posts and special police operations.

46. At Sremska Raca, on 9 February, a truck had 100,000 cigarettes in a concealed container. The cigarettes and the truck were confiscated and taken to Novi Sad for inspection. On 10 February, two trucks approached the crossing point at considerable speed, and as the barrier was up, they passed straight through. The assessment of the Mission observers was that the trucks were waiting for the right moment as there were only a few vehicles at the crossing point. Customs officials gave conflicting reasons for the incident. On 11 February, a military truck was allowed to cross without being checked. On 27 February, two buses, each containing about 50 young men, crossed the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was explained that they were young soldiers going on holiday following their basic training. No obvious military equipment or clothing was seen on the buses. Both buses had Vukovar plates.

47. At Badovinci, on 11 February, a Bosnian Serb police officer in uniform and with a side-arm was allowed to cross the border. On the same day, another violation occurred when a van full of stationery was allowed to cross into the "Republika Srpska".

48. At Trbusnica, on 26 February, a car full of goods was allowed to cross the border. The customs officials' justification for this was that the goods were for the Army. This incident has been reported to the Head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for an explanation.

49. On 11 February, an incident occurred at the Sastavci crossing, when two cars crossed the border into the "Republika Srpska" using the bypass road. The cars appeared at the Sastavci border crossing point but were rejected for arriving too late at the crossing point which had already closed. The Mission team noticed the cars when they returned to the bypass road and crossed into the "Republika Srpska". The local police and the Mission teams jointly investigated the matter. Tracks were discovered on the bypass road indicating that it had been used by several cars. As a result two official requests were made: (a) that the bypass be effectively closed; and (b) that the owners of the vehicles be prosecuted.

50. At Metaljka, on 16 February, some excessive foodstuffs were stopped from crossing the border. Observers witnessed some of these goods re-entering Bosnia via a small bypass track which is usable only for pedestrians. The goods were loaded onto vehicles on the other side of the border.

51. A helicopter (Mi-8) with Red Cross insignia flew across the border from Montenegro to Bosnia along the Drina valley at Scepan Polje on 21 February at 1030 hours. The flight had not been authorized by the United Nations. The Yugoslav Army has been unable to confirm the mission status (authorized or unauthorized) of the helicopter sighting. During the Mission Coordinator's meeting on 28 February with Mr. Kertes, he informed the Mission Coordinator that the Montenegrin police had confirmed the flight of a helicopter, but insisted that it had only taken place along the border and had not crossed into Bosnia.

52. At Vracenovici, a van passed through the border crossing point after its closing, on 20 February, at 2055 hours. It was not checked and the Mission observers estimate that it was carrying 10 large tyres.

53. The Mission Coordinator has been informed by UNPROFOR Belgrade of a number of air crossings of the border that have taken place between 21 and 27 February 1995. Since being allowed full and unimpeded access to the radar room at Surcin, UNMO controllers have detected several slow-moving contacts which appear to have crossed the border between Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These contacts have been tracked travelling only from west to east. Precise details on these reports have been submitted by UNPROFOR through their chain of command. The UNMO controller had access to the raw radar of the military scope at all times. At the time the weather was good and the ground speed of the contacts was between 45 and 95 knots. Crossings were made at various points between Bijeljina and Priboj during the day and at night. None of these crossings has been visually witnessed by Mission members. The Mission is following up these reports.

54. At the Vilusi border crossing point, on 8 February, the police confiscated three hand grenades, over 200 rounds of small-arms ammunition, a knife and miscellaneous military equipment from a car. On 9 February, at the Vilusi bypass, the Mission mobile patrol encountered a car leaving the barrier in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On the "Republika Srpska" side of the barrier, the patrol observed two men loading a car with about 200 litres of fuel and about 500 cartons of cigarettes. The patrol radioed for police assistance, but the smugglers had left before the police arrived. The Mission mobile patrol gave the identification of the vehicles to the police.

55. There are signs that the so-called Vilusi bypass is frequently used by smugglers. Contraband is carried around the barrier on the road. On 16 February, a Mission mobile patrol noticed a smuggler in the vicinity of the bypass. The observer suggested that the smuggler turn himself in to the police at the border crossing point, which he did. His goods were confiscated and, according to the police, he was arrested. A second barrier closer to the main road has been built to prevent continued smuggling activities. Customs teams and police have been patrolling in the area.

56. In the Nudo valley, the police have received instructions to man the Nudo crossing, and a customs officer arrived at Nudo on 3 February. The Mission Coordinator sent a letter to the Second Army Commander, General Babić, on 30 January, proposing that a "provisional" checkpoint be established on the Nudo valley road. In addition, the Mission Coordinator proposed that a movable barrier be installed on the track leading south from the Nudo valley and that some additional barricades be constructed on the tracks in the border area to the north of Vilusi, as soon as the weather conditions permitted.

57. On 7 February, a provisional crossing point was established in the Nudo valley with the customs, the police and the Mission observers maintaining a 24-hour presence. The checkpoint can be used only by people living in the Nudo valley. The main border crossing point for traffic towards Trebinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains at Vilusi. Under this arrangement, the Mission Coordinator made it clear that abuse of the checkpoint for smuggling purposes would automatically require re-establishment of a permanent barricade, should the Mission conclude that this is the only effective way to ensure compliance with the Government's border closure policy.

58. To enhance the closure of the Montenegrin border, the military has built six additional barricades on tracks north of Vracenovici and blocked one more track south of Krstać.

59. On 3 February, the Mission Coordinator, together with his Senior Political Advisor, met the Head of the Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. M. Kertes. They discussed requirements contained within Security Council resolution 970 (1995), paragraph 3, and especially the contents of the phrase "international humanitarian agencies". At the same time the Memorandum on Definitions of Humanitarian Aid, signed by Mr. Kertes and Mr. Pellnas on 4 November 1994 (S/1994/1372, appendix), was discussed. No changes in the prevailing practices were made.

60. During the 30 days, from 14 January to 14 February 1995, Sector Belgrade sealed a total of 925 trucks with a total weight of 19,109 metric tons. The average number of trucks sealed, each 30 days, in the first 100 days was 1,185, with a weight of 15,995 metric tons. During the period from 14 January to 14 February, there were fewer loads but with increased tonnage. Around 70 per cent of the trucks sealed belong to the Yugoslav Red Cross, whose trucks account for around 80 per cent of the total tonnage.

61. At several border crossing points during the last week of February, many vehicles with 4 to 6 sacks of fertilizer were crossing the border to Bosnia. According to information from the local customs authorities, fertilizer suppliers in Badovinci are paying anyone who is willing to deliver any number of sacks of fertilizers to their shops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A great number of vehicles have been denied crossing for the second time in a day. Excess amounts of fertilizer, beer and fuel continue to be the main violations reported.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

62. In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the past 30 days no transshipments were detected by the Mission across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

IX. FUNDING

63. The Co-Chairmen wish to draw particular attention to the fact that the resources available for the Mission have been exhausted and that unless contributions outstanding are received urgently the Co-Chairmen will have no alternative but to wind down the Mission.

Appendix I

Financial status as at 28 February 1995

Contributions		United States dollars
1.1	Voluntary contributions	735 988.08 a/
1.2	Assessed contributions	1 153 975.83
	Total	1 889 963.91

Statement of account with Swiss bank corporations

2.1	Funds transferred to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Belgrade	1 872 186.55
2.2	Expenses paid by bank on behalf of the Mission	1 758.27
2.3	Banking charges	31.04
2.4	Balance of funds with bank	15 988.05
	Total	1 889 963.91

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a/ Voluntary contributions totalled $800,000. At the start of the Mission, an amount of $64,011.92 was taken directly to Belgrade without passing through the bank account of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Appendix II

Status of assessments as at 28 February 1995

(United States dollars)

Contributing States	Percentage share	Proportionate share of cost	Contributions received	Outstanding balance	Credit against assessment
Albania	0.01	313.00	0.00	313.00	
Austria	0.75	23 487.00	23 458.86	28.14	
Belgium	1.53	47 914.00	47 913.00	1.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.04	1 253.00	0.00	1 253.00	
Bulgaria	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Canada	3.11	97 394.00	0.00	97 394.00	
China	0.77	24 114.00	24 113.00	1.00	
Croatia	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Denmark	0.94	29 437.00	0.00	29 437.00	
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)	0.14	4 384.00	0.00	4 384.00	
France	8.68	271 825.00	271 825.00	0.00	
Germany	12.92	404 606.00	404 606.00	0.00	
Greece	0.51	15 971.00	15 971.00	0.00	
Hungary	0.18	5 637.00	0.00	5 637.00	
Ireland	0.26	8 142.00	8 143.00	(1.00)	
Italy	6.21	194 474.00	0.00	194 474.00	
Japan	12.45	389 887.00	0.00	389 887.00	
Luxembourg	0.09	2 818.00	0.00	2 818.00	
Netherlands	2.17	67 956.00	67 957.00	(1.00)	
Norway	0.55	17 224.00	17 224.00	0.00	
Portugal	0.29	9 082.00	9 082.00	0.00	
Romania	0.17	5 324.00	0.00	5 324.00	
Russian Federation	6.71	210 132.00	0.00	210 132.00	
Saudi Arabia	0.96	30 064.00	0.00	30 064.00	
Senegal	0.01	313.00	0.00	313.00	
Slovakia	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Slovenia	0.09	2 818.00	0.00	2 818.00	
Spain	2.87	89 878.00	0.00	89 878.00	
Sweden	1.11	34 761.00	0.00	34 761.00	
Switzerland	1.16	36 327.00	36 327.00	0.00	
Turkey	0.27	8 455.00	0.00	8 455.00	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7.26	227 356.00	227 355.97	0.03	
United States of America	25.00	782 906.00	0.00	782 906.00	
Organization of the Islamic Conference	2.40	75 159.00	0.00	75 159.00	
TOTALS	100.00	3 131 624.00	1 153 975.83	1 977 648.17	

Note: The table reflects the current status of contributions for the period from 1 December 1994 to 31 May 1995. It does not include voluntary start-up contributions.

Appendix III

Border points in the Mission, updated as at 1 March 1995

BCP = BORDER CROSSING POINT, MANNED AND CONTROLLED BY ICFY AND THE FRY AUTHORITIES
(19 + 2 TRAIN STATIONS)

CCP = CONTROLLED CROSSING POINT, MANNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE FRY AUTHORITIES
(13)

UCP = UNCONTROLLED (UNMANNED / USED OR POTENTIAL) CROSSING POINT
(71)

(JA = THE YUGOSLAV ARMY'S MILITARY COMPOUNDS FROM WHERE THEY PATROL THE CCPs)
(9)

HOW TO READ :

BCP BE 01 = BORDER CROSSING POINT BELGRADE 01

CCP A 08 = CONTROLLED CROSSING POINT ALPHA 08

UCP BB 01 = UNCONTROLLED CROSSING POINT BAJINA BASTA 01

AND SO ON.

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BELGRADE

BCP BE 01	**JAMENA (CQ 487 711)**	**24 HOURS**
	MILITARY FERRY (NOT USED)	1 CARAVAN
BCP BE 02	**SREMSKA RACA (CQ 656 743)**	**24 HOURS**
	BRIDGE, OPEN 24 HOURS	2 CARAVANS

(RAILWAY CLOSED), UNHCR/ICRC/YRC — CAPSAT TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR ALPHA

BCP A 04 **BADOVINCI (CQ 687 599)**
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS+ POLICE

CCP A 04A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 715 784)

CCP A 04B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 718 791)

CCP A 04 C BALATUN (CQ 716 683)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

CCP A 04D (CQ 656 640) — SMUGGLING INCIDENT FOR EX. 28 FEB

CCP A 05 LESNICA (CQ 648 467)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

CCP A 05A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 687 556)

CCP A 05B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 680 550)

CCP A 05C SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 678 536)
WITH THE ACCESS TO SECONDARY CREEK FROM THE RIVER

BCP A 06 **TRBUSNICA (CQ 556 338)**
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

UCP A 06A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 616 445)

CCP A 06B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 592 409)

CCP A 06C DISUSED FERRY (CQ 567 391)
WITH CABLE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA

UCP A 06D SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 563 362)

CCP A 07 BANJA KOVILJACA (CQ 610 306)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

UCP A 07A GORNJA KOVILJACA (CQ 519 271)
SMALL BOAT CROSSING

CCP A 08 **DONJA BOBNA (CQ 526 210)**
CLOSED RAILWAY, SEALED, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP A 09 **MALI ZVORNIK (CQ 507 187)**
BRIDGE, OPEN 0600-1900, ONLY UNHCR — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

CCP A 10 STARI MOST ZVORNIK (CQ 493 145)
BRIDGE FOR PEDESTRIANS AND EMERGENCY VEHICLES, OPEN 0600-1900
CONTROLLED BY POLICE 24 HRS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR ALPHA CONT'D

CCP A 11 DAM ZVORNIK (CQ 491 145)
BRIDGE FOR PEDESTRIANS, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

UCP A11A (CQ 545 654)

UCP A11B (CQ 665 636)

BCP A 12 LJUBOVIJA (CQ 688 960)
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900

24 HOURS
2 CARAVANS
CAPSAT
TELEPHONE/
CUSTOMS

CCP A 12A GRAVEL BEACH (CP 778 898)
WITH 2 OBSERVED BOATS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BAJINA BASTA

UCP BB 00A	VITINOVAC (CP 787 859) 25 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 00B	GORNJA TRESNICA (CP 781 871) 22 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 01	FAKOVICI (CP 812 821) 15 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	4 PONTOONS RESTORED ON THE RIVER BANK FRY SIDE
UCP BB 01A	PAUNICE (CP 844 811) 12 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 02	KOD KAMENA (CP 863 796) 9,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 03	OKLETAC OLD (CP 865 802) 9 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 03A	GAZOM (CP 865 883) 7,7 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 04	OKLETAC NEW (CP 867 810) 7,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 04A	VRANJKOVINA (CP 882 789) 4 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 04B	BANDERA (CP 881 788) 3,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 05	OVCINJA (CP 895 779) 1 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 05A	OVCINJA (CP 894 778) N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 05B	ROGACICA (CP 893 774) ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 06	DONJA PETRICA (CP 895 741) 2 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	USED ALMOST DAILY
UCP BB 07	PETRICA (CP 896 748) 3 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 08	CRIVICA DONJA (CP 878 741) 5 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 09	CRIVICA GORNJA (CP 867 733) 7 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	

BCP BB 10	**SKELANI (831 703)** BRIDGE, NO BUSES AND LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900	**24 HOURS** 1 CARAVAN 1 WOODEN CABIN TELEPHONE
UCP BB 10A	BESEROVINA (CP 767 686) 7 KM FROM SKELANI, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
CCP BB 10B	**PERUCAC DAM (CP 723 692)** 12 KM W OF SKELANI, DAM, PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE, OPEN 0600-1900 CONTROLLED BY POLICE (24HRS) AND CUSTOMS	

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BAJINA BASTA CONT'D

UCP BB 10C	WATERMILL RUIN (CP 632 654) 5,5, KM WSW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10CA	VELIKI STOLAC (CP 623 646) HUGE TREE ACROSS THE DIRT ROAD	
UCP BB 10D	CAPTAINS WATER (CP 636 632) 6,4 KM SW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10E	TRENCH VIEW (CP 660 614) 7,3 KM SSW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10F	PECENICE (CP 666 588) 3 KM W OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10G	RAJACI (CP 669 584) 3 KM SW OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10H	BOLISTE (CP 674 576) 4 KM SSW OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10I	BOLISTE STN (CP 674 570) 1 KM S OF BOLISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10J	BARE (CP 682 558) BARE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10K	RIJEVICE (CP 692 550) RIJEVICE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10L	TETREBICA (CP 705 525) TETREBICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 10LA	ZAGVOZNICA (CP 736 498) TRACK	
UCP BB 10LB	LIPA (CP 737 490) TRACK	
UCP BB 10M	SADDLE (CP 760 475) 1 KM NW OF KOTROMAN, TRACK	
BCB BB 11	**KOTROMAN (CP 769 468)** MAIN ROAD, ONLY UNHCR, OPEN 0600-1900	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ POLICE
UCP BB 12	PANJAK (CP778 446) 3 KM SE OF KOTROMAN, TRACK	
UCP BB 13	COLES TUNNEL (CP 806 398) 2 KM W OF JABLANICA, RAILWAY	
TRAIN STN	**UZICE** (RAIL TEAM - SEALING OF TRAINS)	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT TELEPHONE
TRAIN STN	**PRIBOJ** (RAIL TEAM - SEALING OF TRAINS)	**24 HOURS** 1 CONTAINER CAPSAT TELEPHONE

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BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BRAVO

CCP B 14A **RIVER FORD (CP 788 330)**
PEDESTRIAN WIRE BRIDGE, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP B 15 **RACA (FAP BRIDGE) (CP 783 321)** **24 HOURS**
BIG CONCRETE BRIDGE, PEDESTRIANS, 24 HRS 2 CARAVANS

UCP B 15A **FOOT BRIDGE (CP 786 298)**
1 KM SOUTH OF FAB BRIDGE (PEDESTRIANS)

CCP B 15B **STONE BRIDGE (CP 785 294)**
PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP B 16 **UVAC (CP 783 288)** **24 HOURS**
BRIDGE/SURFACE ROAD 2 CARAVANS
NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 TELEPHONE/
CUSTOMS

UCP B 16A **RAILWAY BRIDGE (CP 783 287)**
100 M SOUTH OF B 16

CCP B 16B **HOSPITAL CHECKPOINT (CP 800 270)**
SURFACE ROAD, OPEN 0600-1900, CONTROLLED BY POLICE 24 HRS

BCP B 17 **SASTAVCI (CP 728 260)** **24 HOURS**
SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES 1 CONTAINER
OPEN 0600-1900 CAPSAT

UCP B 17A **CERALJE (CP 414 284)**
TRACK

BCP B 18 **METALJKA (CP 497 213)** **24 HOURS**
SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES 2 CARAVANS
OPEN 0600-1900 1 CONTAINER
CAPSAT

UCP B 18A **RUJEVICA (CP 361 168)**
TRACK

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BRAVO CONT'D

BCP B 19	**SULA (CP 414 069)** SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES. OPEN 0600-1900 MANNED BY POLICE 24 HRS	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT
UCP B 29	SLATINA / SLATINA ROAD (CN 452 939 / 428 934) TRACK	

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE

UCP C 00	LISICA DO (CP 303 028) BLOWN BRIDGE	NO CROSSING POSSIBLE
(JA 01	POLJE CRKVICKO (CN 288 993) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS)	
BCP C 01	SCEPAN POLJE (CP 254 018) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900,LOCKED - SEALED 1900-0600 CHAIN BARRIER	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT
(JA 02	MRATINJE (CN 218 928) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL, ACTIVE CONTROL OF ALL TRAFFIC)	
CCP C 01A	MRATINJE (CN 216 935) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT NO OBSTACLES	MANNED 24 HRS
UCP C 01B	STUBICA I (CN 147 827) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	(UNOBSERVED SINCE DEC DUE TO SNOW)
CCP C 01C	STUBICA II (CN 148 823) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT WOODEN GATE	MANNED 24 HRS
(JA 03	STABNA (CN 175 814) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL , ACTIVE CONTROL OF ALL TRAFFIC)	
BCP C 02	KRSTAC (4 KM NE OF KRSTAC) (CN 097 667) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900 MONTENEGRIN VILLAGES BEYOND METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS
(JA 04	KRSTAC (CN 122 639) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STEEL POLE ON THE ROAD)	MANNED 24 HRS
CCP C 03	G. CRKVICE (BN 973 655) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT STONE WALL, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	MANNED 24 HRS
(JA 05	CRKVICE (BN 996 589) JA MILITARY COMPOUND ACTIVE TRAFFIC CONTROL)	
UCP C 04	KOVACI (BN 984 599) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY

UCP C 04B	BECKA PEC I (BN 962 555) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE CONT'D

UCP C 04C	BECKA PEC II (BN 961 563) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04D	VRBICA (BN 948 539) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04E	VUCI DO I (BN 956 525) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04F	VUCI DO II (BN 957 514) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
(JA 06	**PILATOVCI (BN967 480) JA MILITARY COMPOUND** OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
UCP C 06	KORAVLJICA (BN 936 478) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 07	VIDINE (BN 935 437) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
BCP C 08	**VRACENOVICI (BN 944 468)** POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900 METAL SAW HORSES	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS
(JA 07	**KLJAKOVICA (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY COMPOUND** OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
CCP C 09	**KLJAKOVICA I (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT** STONE WALL, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS HEADING WEST	**MANNED 24 HRS**
CCP C 09A	**KLJAKOVICA II (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT** STEEL POLE GATE, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS HEADING NORTH	**MANNED 24 HRS**
UCP C 09B	PETROVICI (BN 942 388) STONE WALL	PATROLLED DAILY
CCP C 09C	**RIVER ROAD (OLD RAILWAY ROAD) (BN 938 365)** STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	**MANNED 24 HRS**
UCP C 10	PARESKI DO (BN 966 343) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
BCP C 11	**VILUSI (or ILIJINO BRDO) (CN 006 318)** POLICE AND CUSTOMS, OPEN 24 HOURS METAL SAW HORSES, UNHCR/ICRC/YRC	**24 HOURS** 1 CARAVAN

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE CONT'D

UCP C 11A	FIRST VILUSI BY-PASS (CN 011 329) TWO STONE WALLS, POLICE PATROL CO-OPERATIVE PATROLS	
UCP C 11B	SECOND VILUSI BY-PASS (CN 010 328) STEEL POLE GATE (LOCKED AND SEALED) POLICE AND ICFY OBSERVE AND PATROL	
BCP C 12	NUDO (BN 989 298) (PROVISIONAL BCP) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, ONLY FOR THE LOCALS, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0530-1930 METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS
(JA 08	NUDO (CN 007 278) JA MILITARY COMPOUND OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
UCP C 12A	JARCISTA (CN 001 237) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	SEASONAL PATROLS DUE TO SNOW
BCP C 13	VRBANJ (BN 952 150) NO BUSES AND LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 POLICE/MILITARY/CUSTOMS MONTENEGRIN VILLAGES BEYOND BCP METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT SATPHONE
(JA 09	KAMENO (BN 972 057) JA MILITARY COMPOUND OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	

UNITED
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3 March 1995
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LETTER DATED 1 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan on the preliminary results of the elections to the Majlis-i Olii (Parliament).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-06157 (E) 030395 030395 060395

/...

Annex

Preliminary results of the elections to the Majlis-i Olii (Parliament) of the Republic of Tajikistan

On 26 February 1995, Tajikistan held elections to the Majlis-i Olii (Parliament). As of the morning of 28 February, the results were as follows:

Number of electoral districts: 181; number of polling stations: 2,666; estimated number of voters as at 10 February: 2,684,976, of whom 2,660,749 are listed in the electoral rolls; 2,274,632 voters took part in the voting, which represents a turnout of 85 per cent. The elections were decisive in 161 electoral districts, run-off elections will be held in the remaining districts.

There were 350 registered candidates for the post of deputy. In the overwhelming majority of districts, the elections were held on an alternative basis, with the participation of candidates from work collectives, local representative bodies and political parties.

Twenty-eight representatives from eight countries - the Russian Federation, India, Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States of America, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - as well as representatives from the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States, took part in the elections to Parliament as observers.

Department for International Organizations
and International Law of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan

28 February 1995
Dushanbe

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FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 976 (1995) of 8 February 1995, in which the Council requested me to inform it monthly of progress in the deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex), including the maintenance of an effective cease-fire, free access by UNAVEM III to all areas of Angola, the free flow of humanitarian assistance throughout Angola and compliance by both the Government of Angola and by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

2. The decision of the Security Council to establish UNAVEM III was an important milestone in the settlement of the Angola crisis. It has bolstered the hopes of the Angolan people for genuine peace and national reconciliation.

3. During the period under review, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, continued his efforts to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Following the adoption of resolution 976 (1995), he held extensive consultations with senior officials of the Government and of UNITA. He met, in particular, with Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, and later in Luanda with Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola.

4. At the meeting with Mr. Savimbi, my Special Representative underscored the need for the parties to implement strictly the cease-fire and the specific commitments made by UNITA in the framework of the Lusaka Protocol. The resolutions of the eighth Extraordinary Congress of UNITA, held at Bailundo from 7 to 11 February 1995, were also discussed. It will be recalled, in this connection, that the UNITA Congress approved, inter alia, the Lusaka Protocol and expressed support for the proposed meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, the importance of which was stressed by the Security Council in its resolution 976 (1995). My Special Representative also discussed with

Mr. Savimbi those resolutions of the UNITA Congress which have raised concerns within the international community and have been found objectionable by the Government of Angola.

5. Mr. Savimbi assured Mr. Beye of his readiness to participate in the proposed meeting and to begin discussions with the Government on the practical modalities for it with the participation of UNAVEM. Moreover, the UNITA leader agreed to consider, in the context of the political consultations between the two parties, or at the meeting with President dos Santos, the question of the incorporation of UNITA members into the Government. An understanding was also reached that the issue of mercenaries and the early release of prisoners would be considered by the Joint Commission established in pursuance of the Lusaka Protocol.

6. My Special Representative also discussed with President dos Santos the resolutions of the UNITA Congress concerning the participation of UNITA members in the management of the affairs of State. During those exchanges, the President confirmed his readiness to meet with Mr. Savimbi. I therefore hope that both sides will now move expeditiously to organize and hold this meeting, so as to signal to the Angolan people and the international community that the process of national reconciliation has effectively begun.

7. During the period under review, my Special Representative continued to chair the Joint Commission, the principal body in charge of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, in which the two parties and the three observer countries (the United States of America, Portugal and the Russian Federation) participate. Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, the Commission has held 10 regular and 3 extraordinary sessions. The third extraordinary session of the Joint Commission, held on 20 February 1995, dealt with the incident on 13 February in which a United Nations helicopter was shot at by UNITA in Quibaxe, Cuanza Sul province. The Commission noted that UNITA had recognized its responsibility for the incident and that it had promised to avoid such incidents in the future.

8. Despite some progress in carrying out various aspects of the Lusaka agreements, the situation continues to be tense in several parts of the country. This situation has been exacerbated by the widely publicized assertions made recently by Colonel "Zavarra", a UNITA defector, who claimed that, despite statements in support of the Lusaka process, his leadership was preparing for a major military offensive. Subsequently, in a press communiqué issued on 26 February, the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) accused UNITA of non-compliance with th cease-fire and strongly warned it that it might respond to what it considered as provocations by UNITA. My Special Representative is trying to convince both sides to desist from such public exchanges.

III. MILITARY SITUATION

9. During the period under review, the cease-fire in Angola continued in general to hold. In many areas, tensions decreased markedly, and UNAVEM III consolidated its contacts at various levels with FAA and UNITA military forces. However, difficulties persist in carrying out liaison with UNITA in several

parts of the country. In addition, technical problems have been encountered in establishing effective triangular communications between UNAVEM and the two parties.

10. After a period of relatively low-level cease-fire violations, tensions have escalated somewhat in the last two weeks, in particular in the northern region. Formal complaints of cease-fire violations were received from both the Government and UNITA, but not all of the reported cases could be verified and confirmed by the United Nations. Many complaints included alleged UNITA attacks on villages, ambushes, looting, abduction of civilians, mine-laying and other violations. On the Government side, some unauthorized movements of troops and military air activity have recently been reported.

11. Progress has been achieved in the disengagement of troops in the central region of the country. However, the agreements reached in this regard in Chipipa and Waku Kungo by the Government and UNITA Chiefs of Staff concerning the areas of Uige and Negage have proved extremely difficult to implement. Despite several visits to the area by the Force Commander of UNAVEM, the disengagement of UNITA troops has been frustratingly slow.

12. UNAVEM III has continued to expand in accordance with the previous resolutions of the Security Council. As at 1 March, 418 United Nations military and police observers had been deployed to 38 sites outside Luanda. Approximately 40 additional military and police observers were expected to arrive in Luanda shortly. UNAVEM deployment to the countryside has been slowed down by recent incidents of shooting at UNAVEM aircraft by UNITA (in particular in Quibaxe on 13 February and in Licua on 18 February), lack of security clearances to visit certain areas and restrictions on freedom of movement, in particular by UNITA, but in recent days also by the FAA. In some regions, UNITA requested 48 hours' notice before any movement of United Nations flights and convoys. In general, United Nations access to UNITA-controlled areas has been limited.

13. The issues raised in paragraphs 9 to 12 above are being addressed through the Joint Commission. At the tenth session of the Commission, held on 1 March, UNITA agreed to issue orders to all its personnel to avoid incidents. To that effect it promised to use various channels of communication, including its radio, Vorgan, and to facilitate the necessary liaison procedures. In order to expedite the resolution of those issues, the Joint Commission established an ad hoc military working group. In another positive development, UNITA confirmed to my Special Representative that, as at 2 March, it would commence disengagement in the areas where it had not yet done so, in particular in Uige and Negage, and that it would ensure the safety of United Nations flights. UNITA also pledged to cooperate in the full integration of its troops into the national army.

14. The United Nations Secretariat and my Special Representative are pursuing with the Government of Angola, including at the highest levels, several pressing issues in connection with its contribution to UNAVEM III, in particular the provision of critical services and access to key Angolan facilities (airports, ports, storage, working premises, etc.). The Angolan authorities have made available to UNAVEM some accommodation, as well as air and vehicular transport.

In the absence of the provision of further facilities on an urgent basis, it will become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deploy UNAVEM III within the demanding time-frame stipulated in my report of 1 February (S/1995/97 and Add.1 and Corr.1). Similarly, it is very important for the parties to start de-mining activities without delay.

15. Although preparations for the deployment of United Nations formed units are proceeding, I wish to draw the attention of the Government of Angola and UNITA to the decision of the Security Council in its resolution 976 (1995) that the deployment of infantry units will take place on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General to the Council that the conditions contained in paragraph 32 of my report of 1 February have been met, and provided the Council does not decide otherwise. In the meantime, the Secretariat has asked the troop-contributing countries to keep their personnel on stand-by for early deployment; it has also conducted in-depth briefings for them and continued logistic preparations for the arrival of the main body of UNAVEM III. Some participating Member States have begun reconnaissance for the deployment of their respective units.

16. A draft agreement between the Government of Angola and the United Nations on the status of forces has been prepared by the Secretariat and is being transmitted to the Government of Angola for its urgent consideration.

17. I would like to express my appreciation to the Member States that have agreed to contribute to this important peace-keeping operation and are preparing formed units for deployment. In many instances, those preparations are proceeding on schedule, and advance parties are expected to arrive in March/April. However, unless troop-contributing countries take certain required steps, including the urgent provision to the Secretariat of load lists for their units and of a clear indication of departure dates, the timetable for deployment could be affected.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

18. Over the past two months, United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations have stepped up their efforts to assess the humanitarian needs in newly accessible areas of Angola and to extend the geographic reach of their assistance programmes. Inter-agency teams visited localities in the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kwando Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Malange, Uige and Zaire to examine food, health and other needs. My Special Representative also visited the towns of Uige, Jamba and Ondjiva to verify the humanitarian situation there. These assessments have brought to light major health and nutrition problems in many areas of the country. At the same time, heavy rains have led to an increase in the incidence of cholera and diarrhoea in a number of towns, including the overpopulated city of Luanda. The prompt intervention of non-governmental organizations, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), made it possible to control these localized epidemics.

19. In spite of some spontaneous movement of populations, especially in the provinces of Bengo, Benguela, Kwanza Norte and Moxico, it is expected that most

of the internally displaced persons will wait until the April harvest before returning to their areas of origin. The combined threat of mines and banditry continue to hinder the free movement of persons throughout the country. While WFP is committed to a heavier reliance on road transport, overland deliveries are still impeded by conflict and war-damaged infrastructure. However, humanitarian organizations are making steady progress in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of road infrastructures.

20. The mine-awareness campaign is continuing throughout the country. Close collaboration between non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies has permitted the widest possible dissemination of information to communities at risk. The Central Mine Action Office of the United Nations Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH), together with UNAVEM, has established a Mine Action Working Group with the close participation of the competent non-governmental organizations. Among the main priorities is the conduct of a thorough mine survey in order to identify which areas require urgent action. On the basis of these results, strategic mine clearance will be undertaken to improve the logistics of humanitarian operations. International non-governmental organizations are in the process of training Angolan instructors and technicians in such towns as Kuito and Luena, where a number of mine-clearance operations have already begun.

21. Together with UNAVEM, the Demobilization and Reintegration Office of UCAH has set up a committee on quartering areas to establish criteria for site selection, infrastructure and the provision of services such as health care, water and sanitation as well as all related infrastructure. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office is also designing a data-processing system to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the quartering areas and sponsoring a study on strategies for the effective reintegration of soldiers into civilian life. The Humanitarian Coordination Group, which includes representatives of the Government, UNITA and UCAH, with the participation of other United Nations agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has met eight times since its establishment in January in order to examine the humanitarian situation in Angola and to define priorities.

22. The 1995 United Nations Inter-agency Appeal for Angola was presented to the donor community at a meeting held at Geneva on 23 February under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. During the meeting, several donor countries made explicit pledges amounting to $71 million, while others expressed their intention to make substantial contributions at a later stage. I hope that these countries will make good on their pledges as soon as possible in order to enable the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to implement life-saving programmes in Angola and to lay the foundations for rehabilitation projects towards the end of 1995.

V. OBSERVATIONS

23. As the present report shows, although some progress has been achieved in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, many difficulties still have to be resolved, and it is essential that more concrete signs of cooperation and goodwill be provided by both parties, especially in this initial phase of the

resumed peace process. The decision of the Security Council to establish UNAVEM III was an act of faith by the international community in the determination of the Angolan parties to put an end to the civil war that has ravaged their country and to embark resolutely on the path of peace and national reconciliation. However, the history of the Angolan conflict and the lessons learned from other recent peace-keeping operations have led the Security Council to adopt a new approach and to agree to my proposal to link the actual deployment of the bulk of UNAVEM III to the prior implementation by the parties of certain specific commitments made by them under the Lusaka Protocol.

24. As stated in paragraph 32 of my report of 1 February (S/1995/97 and Add.1 and Corr.1), it would be difficult to justify the deployment of infantry units unless the following essential initial tasks have been implemented: an effective cease-fire; the full disengagement of Government and UNITA forces; the setting up of verification mechanisms; the establishment of reliable communication links between the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM; the provision to, and verification by, UNAVEM of all relevant military data, including troop itineraries; the designation of all quartering areas; the withdrawal of troops to the nearest barracks; and the early start of de-mining activities. Evidently, these steps require free and unhindered access by UNAVEM to all areas of the country. It is also important that a realistic and practicable arrangement on the modalities for integration of UNITA troops into the national army of Angola be reached without further delay. Moreover, the agreed meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi should take place in the near future, so as to provide a much needed momentum to the peace process.

25. Under the timetable approved by the Security Council, the deployment of the infantry units of UNAVEM III is scheduled to begin on 9 May 1995. In view of inescapable logistic constraints, this can be achieved only if I am in a position to notify the Security Council by 25 March, at the latest, that the parties have substantially complied with the conditions set forth in paragraph 4 of resolution 976 (1995). I therefore most strongly urge the Government of Angola and UNITA to take, before that date, the concrete actions without which I will have no choice but to advise the Security Council that the deployment of infantry units must be deferred. At a time when the extensive involvement of the United Nations in numerous other complex conflict situations is seriously taxing its limited resources, parties who request the assistance of the Organization must also be prepared to help the international community to help them.

26. In the meantime, the coming into effect of the cease-fire and the ensuing improvement of security conditions in the country have encouraged the movement of populations and economic activity, thereby decreasing the overall reliance on humanitarian aid. Displaced persons and other vulnerable populations, however, continue to require significant assistance, and land-mines remain a serious impediment to the movement of people and goods, as well as to the resumption of agricultural activity. The capacity of the humanitarian agencies to contend with these problems and to contribute to the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants depends on full and prompt funding by the donor community of the humanitarian programme set out in the 1995 Inter-agency Appeal for Angola.

Annex

UNAVEM III military and civilian police personnel

(as at 1 March 1995)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Military medical personnel	Total
Algeria	10			10
Argentina	2	3		5
Bangladesh	10			10
Brazil	19	15	11	45
Bulgaria	10			10
Congo	7			7
Egypt	10			10
Guinea-Bissau	11	15		26
Hungary	10	15		25
India	19			19
Jordan	20	20		40
Malaysia	20	20		40
Morocco		2		2
Netherlands	14	9		23
New Zealand	3			3
Nigeria	20	15		35
Norway	4			4
Poland	7			7
Portugal	6			6
Russian Federation	10			10
Slovakia	5			5
Sweden	18			18
Uruguay	10			10
Zambia	10			10
Zimbabwe	21	17	—	38
Total	276	131	11	418